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This study analyzes consumers’ behavioral responsiveness to changes in price and 
policy regarding residential electricity consumption, using a hybrid method of 
econometric analyses and energy market simulations with the National Energy Modeling 
System (NEMS). First, this study estimates price elasticities of residential electricity 
demand with the most recent Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) data, 
collected in 2005, employing a conventional econometric model and a 
discrete/continuous choice model. Prior to the NEMS experiments with price shocks and 
consumers’ behavioral features, this study uses NEMS to examine how energy policies 
would affect changes in retail electricity price in the future.  
When climate policies are implemented nationally, electricity prices are estimated 
to increase by 17% in 2030 with a carbon cap and trade initiatives and by 4% with 
Renewable Electricity Standards (RES). The short-run elasticity of demand estimated 
from the 2005 RECS is found to be in a range of –0.81 ~ –0.66, which is more elastic 
than the current NEMS assumption of –0.15. The 2005 RECS dataset details information 
about American households’ energy consumption. This rich source of micro-level data 
complements the existing econometric analysis based on time series data.  
Electricity price (either census-division average price or household average price), 
annual income and number of rooms are found to be three major determinants of the level 
of electricity consumption. The difference in short-run price elasticity leads to a 
difference in social welfare estimates of energy policies and energy market forecasts. 
This study suggests that the estimate of social welfare loss caused by electricity price 
increase is overestimated if the elasticity is assumed to be smaller than the actual 
responsiveness. Supposing that 1) the short-run elasticity of –0.66 reflects the actual 
consumers’ responsiveness to price changes in the present and future and 2) retail 
 xi 
electricity prices permanently increase by 10%, the welfare loss caused by the price 
increases would be estimated 0.9 billion dollars less than the current estimates with the 
elasticity of –0.15. This result suggests that if people are assumed to be more elastic to 
price signals, the time it takes for a policy to accomplish its goal could be shorter.  
In addition to assessing potential savings expected from consumers’ behavioral 
changes with the concept of price elasticity of demand in neoclassical economic theory, 
this study reviews economic and non-economic theories about behavioral features of 










 Traditional energy policies have focused on price changes such as tax credits and 
subsidies for energy-efficient goods and on information disclosure such as energy-use 
labels on appliances (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010). How the demand for a fuel is 
affected by its price changes determines the effectiveness of the price, subsidy, and tax 
policies. For that reason, energy policy makers have sought to understand behavioral 
patterns of consumers so as to design effective energy pricing policies. Previous studies 
have argued that a better comprehension of how consumers respond to price increases is 
important to build a safeguard against sudden supply shock that might occur in the future 
(Rajeev, 1994). Even though it is well known that the typical household adjusts its energy 
consumption in response to price changes even over short durations, policy makers do not 
seriously recognize this fact because clear and unambiguous evidence of such behavior 
has been lacking (Reiss and White, 2005). One of the reasons that these debates are 
persistent is that few prior studies document how quickly households respond to energy 
price shocks (IEA, 2005a, 2005b; Reiss and White, 2005). 
On the other hand, many countries have devoted substantial public resources to 
research and development (R&D) for energy-efficient technologies and to information 
disclosure programs for the public since energy efficiency depends on these technological 
developments and the choices of users. In general, the level of energy efficiency in a 
society is lower than the socially optimal level because there exists a gap between the 
socially optimal level of energy efficiency and the actual observed energy efficiency. 
This ―efficiency gap‖ can be explained with some market failure and behavioral failures 
in the energy market (Hirst and Brown, 1990). Implicit discount rates to consumers may 
be higher than the market discount rate. Consumers may weigh present and visible cash 
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flows against uncertain future flows. The gap could occur with some hidden costs, such 
as search costs (Jaffe et al., 2004), or with the irreversibility of energy efficiency 
investment (Hassett and Metcalf, 1995 &1993; van Soest and Bulte, 2000). Some 
informational barriers may occur when consumers do not have enough usable 
information to make investments that are in their own best interests. Even when a bounty 
of information is available to consumers, the information is often presented in terms that 
are not specific enough to be useful or to drive change. For these reasons, a 
comprehensive understanding about consumers’ behavioral characteristics is a 
prerequisite for effective policy design. 
Along the guidelines of the literature, this study probes how energy consumers in 
the residential buildings sector respond to changes in electricity price in the short run, and 
analyzes how energy policies and short-run behavioral attributes affect changes in 
demand and social welfare in the long run. This study discusses these issues around 
residential electricity demand, price, and policy, answering the four questions listed 
below: 
 
Q1. How do households respond to changes in electricity price in the residential 
buildings sector in the short-run? 
Q2. Do existing and future energy policies affect residential electricity prices? 
 
Q3. How does the short-run responsiveness (elasticity) influence the long-run 
demand forecast? 
Q4. How do assumptions of consumer behavior affect the ex ante evaluation of 
policy options? 
 
Q1 is answered in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 by a literature review and estimations of short-run 
price elasticities. Q2 is discussed in Chapter 5. A set of simple and preliminary NEMS 
 3 
simulations is run to answer this question in Chapter 6. NEMS experiments with various 
scenarios about price changes and short-run price elasticities are conducted. The first 
section of policy implications in Chapter 7 discusses how the assumptions about 
consumer behavior influence the ex ante evaluation of policy options with an example of 
carbon tax. The concept of consumer surplus is borrowed from economics to explain this 
relationship. 
To answer the questions listed above, this study employs a sequential hybrid 
approach in addressing this topic. First, this study discusses various econometric analyses 
using cross-sectional data, and empirically estimates a short-run price elasticity of 
electricity demand based on the Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) data 
collected in 2005. Second, this research reviews economic and non-economic theories to 
understand behavioral features of energy consumers. Third, it probes energy policies that 
could have a potentially large impact on electricity price and consumption in the future. 
For this analysis, national climate policies, residential energy efficiency policies, and 
electricity pricing policies are reviewed. This study then uses the National Energy 
Modeling System (NEMS) to forecast how national electricity consumption of the 
residential sector would change in the long run as consumer behavioral patterns and 
energy policies change. Based on the consumption and price projections, long-run 
elasticities are calculated and changes in social welfare are estimated in the last chapter.  
A better comprehension of the relationships among the short-run and long-run elasticities 
and the involvement of technology shifts could contribute to improving demand-control 
programs in the residential sector.  
As shown in Figure 1.1, variables and concepts discussed in separate chapters are 
interconnected with causality. Chapter 2 reviews economic models that analyze 
residential energy demand with cross-sectional data, and Chapter 3 estimates price 
elasticity of residential electricity demand with a traditional econometric model and a 
dicrete/continuous choice model. Chapter 4 discusses consumer behavior through various 
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economic and non-economic theoretical lenses. In Chapter 5, this study turns to 
discussions about energy policies that could have potentially large impacts on residential 
energy consumption and price.  Chapter 6 presents research designs and findings from the 
NEMS experiments and shows how long-run electricity demand changes in response to 
price shocks and consumers’ short-run behavioral features. The dissertation ends with 
policy implications and conclusions. 
 
 




A REVIEW OF PRICE ELASTICITY ESTIMATION 
 
2.1 Responses to Price Changes 
This study reviews existing literature on price elasticity of energy demand. This 
review focuses on electricity demand, the residential sector, and cross-sectional data 
analysis, which are my research interests. 
 
Price Elasticity of Demand 
 The price elasticity of demand for energy commodities has important policy 
implications for environmental, energy, and taxation policies since it is a comprehensive 
indicator of consumer behavior (Rajeev and Morey, 1993; Rajeev, 1994; Hughes et al., 
2008). Price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity 
consumed divided by the percentage change in price. It is generally measured using the 
logarithmic percentage change formula given by Equation 2.1: 




















               [Equation 2.1]      
where Q1 and X1 are base quantity and price, respectively, and Q2 and X2 are an 
alternative combination of quantity and price. Price elasticity is seriously considered 
when policy makers determine tax and subsidy rates and estimate the marginal social cost 
of a price change in each energy commodity (Rajeev, 1994).  
Since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an 
embargo on petroleum exports in 1973, the U.S. federal government has tried not to 
depend on foreign energy supplies and finally passed the Energy Independence and 
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Security Act (EISA) in December 2007. Academia also realized the importance of energy 
market forecasting and analyzed the responsiveness of energy demand to market changes 
(Rajeev and Morey, 1993; Rajeev, 1994). Previous studies have argued that a better 
comprehension of how consumers react to price increases is important for building a 
safeguard against sudden supply shocks that might occur in the future (Rajeev, 1994).  
 
Responsiveness to Average and Marginal Prices 
 Standard economic theories on demand forecast posit that a household’s 
electricity demand is responsive to marginal price. Carter and Milon (2005) say, ―A key 
assumption in the price specification debate is that households are well-informed or 
behave as-if they are.‖ If consumers are given prices regardless of quantity consumed, the 
marginal price is constant and equal to the average price of the market. However, this 
situation seldom occurs. Block pricing schemes, which depend on the quantity consumed, 
are common these days. Regarding block pricing, the previous literature has discussed 
which of marginal or average price should be entered into the econometric model of 
demand (Carter and Milon, 2005; Espey and Espey, 2004). Taylor (1975) included 
marginal price in his model and introduced a variable that accounts for the lump-sum 
transfers implied by block rates and proposed ways to test the marginal price vs. average 
price models. 
 Because of the theoretical background based on neoclassical economics, a 
majority of studies argue that marginal block price and consumption are simultaneously 
determined (Halvorsen, 1975; Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Espey and Espey, 2004). 
McFadden et al. (1978) presented an alternative instrumental variable (IV) approach, 
whereby observed electricity usage was regressed on dwelling and household 
characteristics and the typical bills. The predicted quantities and the rate schedule are 
used to form the predicted price variable, which serves as an IV for marginal prices.  
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 However, the use of marginal price is appropriate only when consumers are fully 
aware of, and therefore respond to, the marginal price of the nonlinear price schedules 
that utility companies use (Reiss and White, 2005). For that reason, energy demand is 
sometimes assumed to depend on average price (Metcalf and Hassett, 1999; Alberini et 
al., 2010; Fell et al., 2010). Foster and Beattie (1981) argued that households are more 
likely to respond to the average price, because this requires knowledge of only the total 
bill and the total consumption. Many studies show that a majority of consumers do not 
know the marginal energy rates. Brown, Hoffman and Baxter (1975) found that only 4.4% 
of households knew their marginal prices of electricity. Similarly, Carter and Milon 
(2005) found that only 6% of households knew their marginal prices of water. In some 
cases, many individuals showed some cognitive difficulty in understanding nonlinear 
price structures, and many of them used their average prices rather than actual marginal 
prices to make their decisions (Brown, Hoffman, and Baxter, 1975; Carter and Milon, 
2005). More recently, Borenstein also (2008) found that consumers respond to average 
price rather than marginal price or expected marginal price.  Shin (1985) tested an 
alternative hypothesis of the average price perception against marginal price. The 
empirical results support the hypothesis that consumers respond to average price rather 
than actual block marginal price. 
 Moreover, almost all of the energy data sources, such as the EIA and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, provide only the average prices by state, census division, or 
the nation. Zarnikau (2003) used the average prices of electricity and natural gas of 
residential energy consumers in each state in 1994 provided by EIA’s State Energy Price 
and Expenditure Report database. The respondents were assumed to face the statewide 
average prices of electricity and natural gas. Hughes et al. (2008) estimated the short-run 
price elasticity of gasoline demand and used U.S. city average prices for unleaded regular 
fuel in 2006 from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Puller and Greening (1999) used 
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the same data as Hughes et al. (2008) to analyze how households adjust to gasoline price 
changes with nine years of U.S. survey data. 
 
Distinction between Short-run and Long-run Elasticities 
 Based on a broad international survey, Bohi (1981) summarized that short-run 
energy demand is typically found to be less elastic to own-price changes than long-run 
demand. The short run is defined as a period of time in which the quantity of at least one 
input is fixed and the quantities of the other inputs can be varied. The long run is a period 
of time in which the quantities of all inputs can be varied. By responding to a price 
movement, the short-run elasticity measures immediate responses, such as changing 
energy consuming habits, and the long-run elasticity measures total responses, including 
technology shifts (appliance changes). The short-run and long-run distinctions vary from 
one appliance to another. In other words, short-run changes may depend principally on 
changes in consumption of energy services, whereas long-run changes include greater 
alterations of the energy efficiency of the equipment stock (Gillingham, Newell, and 
Palmer, 2009). The energy demand of a home is generally determined by equipment 
efficiency, fuel prices, income, appliance prices, climate, and household and housing 
characteristics. In the short run, households generally control their energy consumption 
by changing their energy-use habits. Thus, in the short-run model, fuel switching or 
technology upgrades are rare and insignificant, in that fuel or technology conversion 
accompanies a necessary capital stock replacement that is generally observed in the long-
run model (EIA, 2003; Wade, 2003).  In the long run, however, consumers adjust to price 
increases by improving equipment efficiency or by changing technology or even fuel 
type. On balance, in the long-run model, responses to energy price variations in 
residential building equipment stocks and fuels are considered to occur endogenously. 
Thus, long-run price elasticities are larger than short-run elasticities because energy 
efficiency improvements can be considered capital turnover in the long run. Long-run 
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responses are determined by equipment costs, equipment efficiencies, energy prices, 
discount rates, maintenance costs, and annual equipment-utilization rates (Wade, 2003). 
In residential energy demand, the input variables of appliance types and building shell 
types are the most resistant variables.  
 
Price Elasticity of Demand in the Residential Buildings Sector 
 Whereas many studies analyze price elasticities of transportation fuels such as 
gasoline, relatively few studies have conducted price elasticity analyses of residential 
energy use. Most of the econometric studies of residential electricity demand that do exist 
were conducted primarily during the 1970s and early 1980s, when energy prices were 
increasing rapidly and concerns about energy conservation were first being raised. The 
spectrum of price elasticity estimates is broad, and there is no consensus regarding the 
magnitude of price elasticities of demand for electricity (Espey and Espey, 2004; 
Athukorala and Wilson, 2010). To quantitatively summarize the studies of residential 
energy demand, Dahl conducted a meta-analysis in 1993. The EIA supported the research 
and has utilized the findings to set the assumptions for identifying household demand 
functions in the NEMS. The meta-analysis conducted by Dahl (1993), ―A survey of 
energy demand elasticities in support of the development of the NEMS,‖ aggregates and 
summarizes the range of residential elasticities based on four previous studies (listed in 
Appendix A of this research) and analyzes mainly price elasticities of electricity and 
natural gas demands. The meta-analysis classifies the previous studies into static, 
dynamic, and structural models. Based on the meta-analysis, the short-run price elasticity 
of demand is set at either 0 or –0.15 by end-use service in the Residential Demand 
Module (RDM) in NEMS: space heating (–0.15), water heating (–0.15), and cooling (–
0.15).  
 A small number of studies on price elasticity of residential energy demand were 
conducted after the 1990s. Reiss and White (2005) conducted a study of California 
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household price response between 1993 and 1997 and found that 44% of households 
exhibited no short-run price response. This means that the households did not respond to 
electricity price changes by changing their energy consumption habits. The heterogeneity 
of price elasticities across households is primarily attributed to differences in appliance 
holdings. While the own-price elasticity for households without an electric space heater 
or a central or room AC is –0.08, households that have central AC are eight times (–0.64) 
more elastic, and those that have electric space heaters exhibit even higher elasticities (–
1.02) than those that do not have them (Reiss and White, 2005). 
 The broad spectrum of estimates can create confusion without more detail about 
the differences in the data and analytical techniques utilized. Responding to the research 
demand, Espey and Espey (2004) conducted a meta-analysis with short-run price 
elasticity estimates ranging from –2.01 to –0.004 with a mean of –0.35 and long-run price 
elasticity estimates ranging from –2.25 to –0.04 with a mean of –0.85. The base model 
used for comparison in the meta-analysis is generally used for price elasticity estimation 
and is a double-log, static, reduced-form OLS model using annual cross-sectional time-
series data for the aggregate United States and a marginal price for electricity.  
 One of the most hotly debated issues in the literature of price elasticity is price 
specification, as discussed in the previous section. Economic theories suggest that the use 
of marginal price is ideal. However, average price is often the only price data available. 
These meta-analyses can be used to guide such analysis of energy demand and to provide 
confidence bounds or adjustment to estimates derived with less than ideal data, for 
instance, aggregated data or average prices. Table 2.1 presents the ranges of own-price 
elasticity estimates analyzed in the two representative meta-analyses of residential 





Table 2.1 Ranges of Estimates of Electricity Own-price Elasticities 
Short Run Long Run 
Range Reference Range Reference 




(mean of 0.35) 
Espey and Espey 
(2004)*** 
0.04~2.25  
(mean of 0.85) 
Espey and Espey 
(2004) 
*Absolute values shown; all values are negative  
** Dahl’s (1993) meta-analysis incorporates research results from previous studies conducted from the late 
1970s to early 1990s. The previous works applied a variety of methods to estimate the elasticity values. 
*** Espey and Espey’s (2004) analysis includes a wider range of studies conducted from 1971 to 2000.  
  
2.2 Estimation and Interpretation of Models of Energy Demand 
 
Conventional Econometric Models with Cross-sectional Data 
Standard economic theory posits that the demand for energy at the residential level 
depends on energy prices, the prices of other goods, income, and other characteristics of a 
household (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Variables commonly included in electricity 
demand are appliance stock, the prices of substitute fuels, and some measure of 
temperature, usually heating and cooling degree-days. In addition to these three variables, 
housing characteristics (e.g., square footage, number of stories, number of rooms) and 
household characteristics (income, education level, age of household members) are 
included in the model (Bohi, 1981). 
Electricity demand has been estimated most commonly using a reduced-form, 
double-log, static model (Espey and Espey, 2004). The simplified demand equation used 
in conventional econometric models for price elasticity analysis appears in Equation 2.2: 
 
ititit uXbaQ  lnln        (i=1,…, N,   t=1,…, T)                             [Equation 2.2] 
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where Qit  is annual consumption of energy consumer of i in time t; Xit is the vector of 
explanatory variables; and uit is the random error term. The variable Xit generally includes 
1) prices of energy fuels, 2) income, and 3) other exogenous variables. The log linear 
nature of Equation 2.2 implies that the vector of estimated parameters b represents 
elasticities (Houthakker, Verleger, et al., 1974; Halvorsen, 1975; Houthakker, 1980; 
McClung, 1988).  
Halvorsen (1975) estimated both a demand equation and a price equation together. 
Since the price equation was included, he employed a two-stage least-squares procedure 
used in typical supply and demand analysis. His explanatory variables included in the Xit 
vector in Equation 2.2 are marginal prices of electricity and natural gas, prices of 
electrical equipment, income, and a variety of weather and housing measures. The 
estimated own-price elasticity of demand was found to be highly significant at –1.1. He 
also estimated a significant income elasticity of 0.51 (Halvorsen 1975). 
According to Espey and Espey (2004), about one-third of the sample of their 
meta-analysis used aggregate data encompassing the entire contiguous 48 states. Several 
studies in the sample analyzed specific census divisions or census regions, whereas others 
analyzed demand in a particular city, such as Los Angeles, or used data obtained from 
specific utility companies or service areas, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
Several of the studies included in their analysis modeled the demand for electricity in 
other countries, including Mexico, Costa Rica, Canada, and Israel. The global energy 
market changed dramatically before and after around 1973, when the OPEC asserted its 
strength, and 2007, when the economic recession started. The authors included 
publication years to determine whether there were systematic changes in elasticity 
estimates over time. 
While many econometric analyses of residential energy demand are based on 
aggregated time-series data, the literature of electricity demand estimation for the 
residential sector that makes use of micro data has been scanty. This is because cross-
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sectional data do not allow for analyzing the dynamics between prices and demand 
changes of a consumer (Filippini and Pachauri, 2004). The time-series analyses postulate 
some lag structure in the estimation to reflect the fact that some adjustments in usage take 
time, such as the acquisition of new appliances. The most common lag structure is the use 
of a lagged dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable to capture long-run 
adjustments imposes a fixed relationship between short-run and long-run elasticities, 
whereas other lag specifications do not necessarily do so. However, time-series analyses 
with aggregate data at the macro (national) level prevalent in price elasticity estimation 
do not consider differences of housing and household characteristics across homes 
(Vaage, 2000; Metcalf and Hassett, 1999; Westoby and Pearce, 1984). Fell et al. (2010) 
argued that the estimates of price elasticity could be affected by aggregation bias and 
recommended using household-level data (cross-sectional micro data). A high degree of 
heterogeneity within the households in a nation justifies the use of detailed micro data in 
the modeling of the energy demand. An increasing number of studies have been 
conducted using micro datasets in the OECD countries, such as Sweden (Leth-Petersen, 
2001; Jung 1993).  
Price specification and rate structure are important issues in the model 
specification, as discussed earlier. Most of the previous studies use the marginal price of 
electricity, but still many use the average price. Other price specifications, such as the 
price perception model (Shin, 1985), also appear in the literature. Flat rates, decreasing 
block rates, and increasing block rates are other alternative price specifications. Haas and 
Schipper (1998) pointed out that elasticities when prices are falling are different from 
those when prices are rising.  
Based on the literature review, a conventional model of residential energy demand 
with cross-sectional data is summarized and ultimately selected for estimating short-run 
price elasticities of residential electricity demand similar to Equation 2.3 (Variables are 
defined in Table 2.2). This model is employed for Model I and Model II (short-run 
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models), analyzed in Section 4.2 in the following chapter. The detailed model 
specifications of the two models are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
lnQD  =  α +β1 lnFPRICE + β2 lnINCOME + β3 lnCHARACTER + β4 
lnCLIMATE+ β5 EQUIPMENT +u        [Equation 2.3]                         
                  
Table 2.2 List of Variables of Typical Models 
 







Electricity consumption in each household (Btu) 
Fuel prices  
Annual income 





Discrete/Continuous Choice Model 
Previous micro-level studies in the 1970s and 1980s limited their analyses to 
short-run models to avoid more complex settings utilizing a discrete choice model of 
appliance number and type (Puller and Greening, 1999). The conventional models for 
estimating energy (electricity) demand have been estimated most commonly using a 
reduced-form, double-log, static model (Espey and Espey, 2004). Although reduced 
models are less cumbersome and easier to estimate, structural models are more likely to 
be considered more accurate, as they separate the dynamic features of demand and allow 
for the identification of the sources of consumption behavior (Bohi, 1981).
1
 Therefore, 
several studies published after the 1980s considering the choice of appliance number and 




 Many studies estimated a structural model of electricity demand using simultaneous equations to jointly 
estimate appliance stock demand and electricity use. In such cases, the estimated price elasticity is the long-
run price elasticity. 
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type as a continuous variable or a function rather than a dummy variable have been 
published (Vaage, 2000; Greene and Hu, 1986; Puller and Greening, 1999). McClung 
(1988), for instance, employed the discrete choice model for appliance portfolio 
selection. He categorized the alternatives into 1) gas space-and-water heating with no 
central air conditioning, 2) gas space-and-water heating with central air, 3) electric space-
and-water heating with central air, and 4) oil space-and-water heating without central air, 
and the estimated expected probability for each option is selected. The estimated 
probability replaces the appliance holding dummy variable. 
The conventional models with the dummy variables may have some endogeneity 
issues. In an econometric model, a parameter or variable is said to be endogenous when 
there is a correlation between the parameter and the error term. However, the endogeneity 
may arise because of a measurement error. Conventional econometric models for 
estimating energy demand with cross-sectional data employ a set of dummy variables 
indicating appliance choice of each observation. Within this model specification, it is 
important to test the statistical exogeneity of appliance dummy variables, because 
demand for electricity is derived through the use of energy-consuming durables (Dubin 
and McFadden, 1984). Dubin and McFadden (1984) attempted to test this bias using a 
subsample of the 1975 survey of 3249 households carried out by the Washington Center 
for Metropolitan Studies (WCMS) for the Federal Energy Administration.  
Employing a structural model of electricity demand using simultaneous equations 
to jointly estimate appliance stock demand and electricity use, McFadden first introduced 
a Random Utility Maximization Model (RUM) in 1981. He merged a discrete choice 
model for appliance choice and a continuous decision model for electricity demand. 
Many electricity demand problems involve a discrete choice of appliance as well as a 
continuous consumption of electricity. For instance, if a consumer selects electricity as 
the fuel for all of his appliances, he will surely have a greater demand for electricity than 
another consumer who selects all natural gas appliances. McFadden (1981) argued that 
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because electricity consumption of a household is highly correlated with the consumer’s 
appliance choices, the electricity consumption and the choice of appliance should be 
considered together. He stated that the discrete/continuous choice model is able to 
capture these sorts of effects parametrically and hence should more accurately describe 
consumer behavior. The discrete decision impacts the consumer’s consumption of 
continuously defined goods. The choice of appliances portfolio requires a discrete 
orientation, while the amount of electricity consumed forms a continuous question. 
Likewise, the decision to select natural gas appliances suggests a lower than average 
demand for electricity.  Later, in 1984, Dubin and McFadden published a complete 
articulation of the discrete/continuous choice model. The model jointly determines the 
demand for appliance and the demand for electricity by appliance. Dubin and McFadden 
(1984) also argued that some other model specifications that ignore the  fact that 
appliance choice and energy use are interconnected will lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates of price elasticities, since the demand for durables and their uses are related to 
decisions made by the consumers. They assumed consumers face a finite, mutually 
exclusive set of alternatives that comprise their space heating choice, and the alternatives 
vary with respect to cost, efficacy, and the preference of the consumer. The mathematical 
model of Dubin and McFadden (1984) is presented in Appendix G. 
The discrete/continuous model introduced by Dubin and Mcfadden (1984) has been 
used by many studies that use cross-sectional survey data and assume the optimizations 
of appliance purchase and appliance use jointly and simultaneously occur. Thus, their 
model implies that price elasticity is interpreted as the long-run response (Dubin and 
McFadden, 1984; McClung, 1988; Vaage, 2000). Vaage (2000) used this 
discrete/continuous model in research conducted in Norway since an overwhelming share 
of Norwegian households installed mixed heating systems and a relatively strong price 
response is to be anticipated. The majority of U.S. households, however, have single-
fuel-based heating systems. Thus, it is almost impossible for them to switch fuel types in 
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a short period of time. Even though he used the discrete/continuous model for his study, 
Vaage (2000) pointed out that an obvious limitation of the model is a lack of data on 
capital costs. For empirical implementation of the discrete choice part of the Dubin-
McFadden model with RECS data, McClung (1988) involved three very strong 
assumptions. The first and the most important assumption is that real capital costs evolve 
slowly enough that contemporary real prices reflect costs at the date of acquisition. 
Proponents of time-series analysis may argue that the assumption is too strong to accept 
in that it is clear that the choice of appliances and the uses of them happen with a 
significant time lag. Second, he assumes that the supply of houses containing various 
equipment portfolios is perfectly elastic to its price differentials, which reflect the 
different capital costs of the various portfolios. Third, he assumes that consumers have 
correctly anticipated future energy prices from the date of acquisition. These three 
assumptions allow the author to treat portfolio selection (discrete choice) as a 
contemporaneous decision with the quantity of fuel (continuous choice) to be purchased. 
This chapter discusses the previous literature’s estimates on price elasticity of 
demand with cross-sectional data. Based on knowledge from this chapter, the empirical 
estimation of price elasticity of residential electricity demand in this study is conducted 
with the 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey data. The estimation details are 
presented in Chapter 4. 
 
A review of post-2000 studies 
Recently, deregulation, record cold winter temperatures, unstable oil prices, and 
continuing global warming concerns have rekindled interest in understanding the demand 
for electricity, particularly in predicting the impact of price changes on consumption 
(Espey and Espey, 2004). Espey and Espey conducted a meta analysis with 36 previous 
studies on price elasticity estimation of residential electricity demand. Except for Garcia-
Cerrutti (2000), all of the articles in their sample are studies conducted from the 1970s to 
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the 1990s. To figure out the recent research trend in price elasticity estimation, this 
chapter reviews studies conducted after 2000. Appendix H summaries 12 studies 
published after 2000 in peer review journals. The majority of the studies used 
longitudinal data to estimate price elasticity of residential electricity demand. Both real 
energy prices and average energy prices are employed for these analyses. Double-log 
function with natural logarithm is still widely used both in time-series and cross-sectional 
data analyses. Almost all of the studies used lagged dependent and independent variables 
to analyzed dynamic relationships between electricity consumption, its price, and other 
variables. Among the 12 studies that this chapter reviewed, only Vaage (2000), Filippini 
and Pachauri (2004), and Yoo et al. (2007) used cross-sectional data, but none of them 
analyzed the U.S. context. The median value of the price elasticities estimated with U.S. 
data is –0.17; that with non-U.S. longitudinal data is –0.33; that with non-U.S. cross-
sectional data is –0.51. Table 2.3 summarizes the empirical results and methods of the 12 
studies reviewed in this chapter.
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 Table 2.3 Empirical results of the residential demand for electricity 
Sources Location Study 
Period 










U.S. 1965-2006 –1.07 ARDL approach 
(cointegration) 







U.S. 1970-2007 –1.6 to 0.6 ADF unit root test, 
Johansen cointegration 
test 
Time series Dynamic/  
Natural log 
Real Price Rolling 
regression 
Horowitz (2007) U.S. 1977-1991/ 
1992-2003 







Nakajima and Hamori 
(2010) 





U.S. with longitudinal data –0.17 (Median)  
Atakhanova and 
Howie (2007) 
Kazakhstan 1994-1997 –0.24 to –0.13 Arellano-Bond (system) 
GMM 
Anderson-Hsiao 
instrumental variable fixed 
effects 








aHoltedahl and Joutz 
(2004) 
Taiwan 1957-1995 –0.15 ADF unit root test 
VAR system 
Conditional ECM model 
Time series Dynamic Real price  















Narayan and Smyth 
(2005) 
Australia 1969-2000 –0.54 to –4.47 Bounds testing procedure 
Conditional error-
correction model 
Time series Dynamic/ 
Natural log 
Real price  
Athukorala and 
Wilson (2010) 
Sri Lanka 1960-2007 –0.62 (long run) 
to –0.16 (short 
run) 
ADF test 






Dynamic Average real 
price 
Regression 
Non-U.S. countries with longitudinal data –0.33 (Median)  
Vaage (2000) Norway 1980 –1.29 and –1.24 Discrete/continuous 
choice model 
Cross section Natural log  MLE(Probit)/ 
OLS 
Filippini and Pachauri 
(2004) 
India 1993-1994 –0.51 to –0.29 Single equation approach Cross section Natural log Average 
price 
 
Yoo et al. (2007) South Korea 2005 –0.25 Bivariate specification of 
Heckman (1979)’s sample 
selection model 
Cross section Natural log Average 
price 
 
Non-U.S. countries with cross-sectional data  –0.51 (Median)  
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Among the 12 studies, Neeland (2009), Horowitz (2007), Nakajima and Hamori 
(2010), and Dergiades and Tsoulfidis (2008) are more thoroughly reviewed in that they 
have the same geographical and sectoral scope as that of this dissertation. Neeland (2009) 
analyzed historical data of residential electricity demand in the United States for the 
period 1970-2007 through the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test which is 
the most common unit root test in time series analysis. Their results indicated that the 
primary driver of adjustments in electricity consumption is the own price elasticity of 
demand and growth in real income per capita. Methodological feature of his study is the 
use transcendental logarithm functions. The chief advantage of the translog functions is 
their ability to estimate substitution elasticities between energy and non-energy inputs or 
between different energy commodities. The method, however, has several limitations 
including concavity violations and a latent lack of degrees of freedom. Horowitz (2007) 
analyzed how electricity demand had changed over the past three decades particularly in 
light of government involvement in electricity demand. His study found that moderate to 
strong commitment to energy efficiency programs reduced electricity intensity by 4.4 
percent in the residential sector. He also indicated that the U.S. economy had transformed 
electricity demand with respect to three key economic variables of electricity price, 
income as measured by per capita income or gross state product, and technological 
change. Nakajima and Hamori (2010) estimated changes in the residential electricity 
market to examine the household sensitivity as a result of retail electricity market 
deregulation policies to residential electricity rates. A panel data analysis was used to 
determine if the variables were stationary and to estimate price elasticity. They found that 
deregulation of the retail electricity market had not changed consumers more sensitive to 
electricity rates and that retail deregulation policies were not the cause of the difference 
in price elasticity between deregulated and non-deregulated states. By adopting these 
explanatory variables concerning temperature, their study was able to capture the 
seasonality of electric power consumption. Dergiades and Tsoulfidis (2008) also 
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examined the residential demand for electricity in the U.S. economy. They defined the 
demand as a function of per capita income, price of electricity, price of oil for heating 
purposes, weather conditions, and stock of occupied housing over the period 1965-2006. 
They employed the occupied stock of houses as a proxy for the stock of electrical 
appliances and identified and ascertained a possible equilibrium relationship among the 
variables through the recently advanced Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
approach to cointegration. Their empirical findings supported to a stable long-run 
relationship among the variables and implied that the sign and magnitude of short-run 
and long-run elasticities were comparable to other similar studies. On balance, the review 
of theses 4 U.S. studies and other 8 non-U.S. studies indicate that the U.S. residential 
electricity demand is relatively stable and inelastic, and the responsiveness is symmetric 
before and after various changes in market regulations and environments. 
 
Comparison of cross-sectional and time-series analyses 
In order to discuss methodological differences between longitudinal and cross-
sectional data analyses, a understanding of the two research methods is required. Because 
conventional and advanced research methods for the cross-sectional data analysis are 
discussed in the earlier sections, this section discusses the major concepts in the time-
series data analysis such as stationarity, unit root test, error correction model, and 
cointegration. Time-series data typically contains a trend and the trend must be removed 
prior to commencing any estimation. Detrending procedures separate the trend from the 
cyclical component of the series. Considerable number of early studies had investigated 
price elasticity of electric power demand, and more recent works have been quite active 
in empirically analyzing nonstationarity of variables (Narayan and Smyth, 2005; Neeland, 
2009). 
The stationarity means a feature of data that the stochastic properties of a variable 
are invariant with respect to time. Suppose Y is the variable to be modeled. The mean of 
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Yt, its variance, and its covariance with other Y values, say Yt-k, do not depend on t. 
Economic time-series data often look non-stationary just because of underlying trend, 
which could be explained by exogenous factors such as population growth. Thus, if the 
trend were removed, the data would be stationary. For that reason, it is important to test 
for nonstationarity before proceeding with estimation. Running regressions on 
nonstationary data can give rise to misleading or spurious values such as R
2
 and t 
statistics, resulting in erroneous conclusions that a meaningful relationship exists among 
the regression variables. Addressing this issue, Box-Jenkins (1970) developed time-series 
analysis which begins by transforming the variable to ensure that it is stationary. 
Although many scientific time series data are stationary, most economic time series data 
are trending and thus clearly cannot be stationary. Thus, Box and Jenkins claimed that 
most economic time-series data could be made stationary by differencing before 
estimating. A variable is said to be integrated of order d, written I(d), if it must be 
differenced d times to be made stationary. Thus, stationary variable is integrated of order 
zero, written I(0). Usually after taking logs to remove heteroskedasticity. This creates a 
new data series, Y*, which becomes inputs that actually used for the Box-Jenkins 
analysis (Kennedy, 2008). 
A traditional econometric equation for estimating demand is specified with a 
generous lag structure on the explanatory variables and/ or the dependent variable. This 
equation has been manipulated to reformulate it in terms that are more easily interpreted, 
producing a term representing the extent to which the long-run equilibrium is not met. 
This term is called an error correction term in that it reflects the current error in achieving 
long-run equilibrium. A distinctive feature of this error correction model is that the long-
run equilibrium position appears explicitly rather than being implicit in the structure of 
the system showing itself in the error correction term. This type of model has been known 
as an error correction model (ECM). Since the 1970s, the Box-Jenkins time-series 
analysis has been actively used. The success of their model and some modified models is 
 23 
because traditional econometric structural models were too static. Their model was 
flexible enough to analyze an economy in which the observed is more frequently out of 
equilibrium (Kennedy, 2008). 
A linear stochastic process has a unit root if there is a root of the characteristic 
equation of the process which is non-stationary. If the other roots of the characteristic 
equation lie inside the unit circle, in other words, have a modulus less than one, then the 
first difference of the process will be stationary. The most common unit root test is the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. If one can reject the null hypothesis that a series 
possesses a unit root, then the series is trend stationary, or integrated of order zero (I(0)). 
If one cannot reject the null of a unit root, then the series is difference stationary. A unit 
root is a feature of processes that evolve through time that can cause problems in 
statistical inference if it is not adequately treated.  
After the stationarity of each variable has been determined an analysis of their 
interaction can be performed with the assistance of cointegration tests. This involves 
normalizing coefficients and testing for co-movement among variables (Kennedy, 2008). 
A long-run equilibrium relationship could be extracted through the application of 
cointegration technique in that it reveals the dynamic interactions among the variables 
under consideration. Suppose that C is electricity consumption, Y is income, and P is its 
price. If the hypotheses of no cointegration relationships among lnC, lnY, and lnP are 
rejected, then the effects of lnY and lnP on lnC must be estimated. Cointegration test 
offers a possible solution to the familiar problem that data non-stationarity may lead to 
spurious regression results (Neeland, 2009). Cointegration can be thought of in a 
transitory or long-run sense. Neeland (2009) points out that increasing number of 
observations through the use of monthly data does not add to the robustness of the 
cointegration results because it is the length of the period that matters, not the number of 
observations. The identification of a possible equilibrium relationship among the 
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variables is ascertained through the recently advanced ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag) approach to cointegration (Dergiades and Tsoulfidis, 2008).  
The post-2000 studies reviewed in this chapter use a time-series or a panel data 
analysis with a dynamic model. However, time series studies lack information concerning 
appliance stock, building characteristics, differences in climates, and demographic 
characteristics and are usually aggregates over the entire nation’s or region’s data. The 
use of this cross-sectional data, on the other hand, allows researchers to consider the 
interventions across the households; thus, the cross-sectional data was used for this 
dissertation, especially Chapter 3 is intended to estimate how differences in housing and 
household characteristics affect consumers’ short-run responsiveness to price changes. In 
addition, since the underlying theory of consumer demand is based on the behavior of 
individual agents, the use of micro data, which reflects individual and household behavior, 
more closely, is able to reflect the nature of consumer responses (Yoo et al., 2007). 
According to the literature review of price elasticity estimation studies, as most studies 
made use of aggregated time series data, they failed to offer the information about 
influence of household’s characteristics on the residential electricity demand. Therefore, 
this dissertation estimates the residential electricity demand using the cross-sectional data 
for analyzing the influence of household and housing characteristics. Based on the 
discussions about the cross-sectional data analysis in the earlier section and the time-
series data analysis in this section, the strengths and weaknesses of the two methods are 








Table 2.4 Pros and Cons of Longitudinal and Cross-sectional Data analyses 
 Longitudinal/Macro Data Analysis Cross-sectional/Micro  Data Analysis 
Pros  Trace actual changes for a 
unit of analysis to respond to 
price changes (Show a 
dynamic model for a market 
to reach a new equilibrium). 
 Be able to consider market 
integrations and stability. 
 Consider individual households’ 
responses. 
 Be able to consider differences 
in housing and household 
characteristics. 
 Reflect individual and household 
behavior more closely, hence 
enable to have a better 
understanding of the nature of 
consumer responses. 
 Degree of freedom is high (The 
number of observations 
compared to that of variables is 
relatively high). 
Cons  Latent lack of degree of 
freedom (The number of 
observations compared to that 
of variables is relatively low.) 
 Potential non-stationarity 
could hinder the analysis. 
 Not be able to reflect 
variations in individual 
consumers’ characteristics 
 Non-response rates of certain 
groups could result in sample 
selection biases. 
 Not be able to capture the actual 
responsiveness of a consumer to 
changes in price over time.  
  
 
As summarized in Table 2.4, microeconomic approaches with micro/cross-sectional 
data to the residential electricity demand modeling also enable different heterogeneous 
household groups to be analyzed. Thus, these approaches allow for a wide variety of 
household characteristics within the estimated equations to be considered. In order words, 
the use of cross-sectional data allows the variation in electricity consumption across 
demographic and geographic subgroups to be examined more extensively (Filippini and 
Pachauri, 2004; Yoo et al., 2007). However, price elasticity estimates are affected by 
non-response rates of certain groups. Yoo et al. indicated that 75 households (19.7%) of 
380 sampled households gave non-response about the residential electricity demand in 
the survey.  When a sample that does not take into account the non-respondents, the 
statistical analysis using the sample cannot be seen to represent the entire population, and 
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finally results in loss of information or statistical efficiency (Yoo et al., 2007). In the 
econometric analysis presented in Chapter 3, Model III indicates that the model lost 
almost 1,000 observations, because the 1,000 respondents did not (were not able to) 
provide information about the type of heating equipment or that of cooling equipment. In 
order to solve this problem caused by missing observations, Baht (1994) employs the 
bivariate model, which is apt to treat such missing data. This bivariate model is 
methodologically similar to the sample selection model. Non-response can cause sample 
selection bias which results in inconsistent parameter estimates. In order to deal with the 
issue of sample selection bias, a sample selection model proposed by Heckman (1979) 
has been commonly used to solve the problems caused by the bias. However, empirical 
applications of the model in the residential electricity demand function estimation remain 
lacking (Yoo et al., 2007). The main contribution of the study conducted by Yoo et al. 
(2007) is that they explore the bivariate model that produces consistent parameter 
estimates and unbiased mean electricity demand estimates when estimating the residential 
electricity demand function. Moreover, their paper compares the results with those from a 
model that assumes no sample selection bias and tested for sample selection bias by using 




PRICE ELASTICITY ESTIMATION  
 
 The price elasticity of demand is an important concept in energy demand 
forecasting, particularly for the analysis of energy-efficiency programs. However, the 
spectrum of price elasticity estimates is broad, and there is no consensus regarding the 
magnitude of price elasticities of demand for electricity (Espey and Espey, 2004; 
Athukorala and Wilson, 2010). This study uses three different econometric models to 
estimate the elasticities. The first two models use a conventional log linear function with 
a set of dummy variables representing equipment choice. One difference between the two 
models is whether to use census division-level average prices or observation-specific 
average prices. One uses average electricity and natural gas prices by census division, 
and the other employs average prices that each household actually faces. The 
observation-specific prices of electricity are derived by a calculation of annual electricity 
bill divided by annual electricity consumption. Those of natural gas are derived from the 
same formula. The third model employs a continuous/discrete choice model, discussed in 
depth in Chapter 2.  
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main purpose of estimating short-run price 
elasticity is to see how sensitively the long-run demand projections computed by NEMS 
respond to the updated short-run price elasticity estimated from the latest survey data. In 
other words, this study estimates the short-run price elasticity of residential electricity 
demand using cross-sectional data to extract only the intrinsic energy-consumption habits 
(characteristics) in the short term. Short-run price elasticities estimated in Section 3.2 of 
this chapter are planned to be plugged into a NEMS model because it contains a 
parametercontrolling short-run demand adjustments. For that reason, I run the 
conventional econometric model with two variations in price (census division level vs. 
household level) and diagnosed with various test statistics. Section 3.3 presents results 
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from the discrete/continuous choice model. All of the three models use the latest 
Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) data collected by EIA in 2005.  
 
3.1 Data  
 The RECS provides information on the use of energy in residential buildings in 
the United States. This information includes the physical characteristics of the housing 
units, the appliances, the demographic characteristics of the household, the types of fuels 
used, and other information that relates to energy use. It also provides energy 
consumption and expenditures data for natural gas, electricity, fuel oil, liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG), and kerosene. The data are organized by twelve different topics: 1) 
housing unit characteristics; 2) kitchen appliances; 3) other appliances; 4) space heating; 
5) water heating, air conditioning (AC), and miscellaneous; 6) fuels used and fuel 
payment; 7) fuel bills and non-residential uses; 8) household characteristics; 9) energy 
assistance and housing unit square footage; 10) characteristics of energy supplier data; 
11) energy consumption; and 12) energy expenditure.  
 This study uses these RECS data for the econometric model to estimate the short-
run price elasticity of electricity demand. The first RECS was conducted in 1978, and the 
latest (twelfth) survey was conducted in 2005. The 2005 RECS collected data from 4,382 
households in housing units statistically selected to represent the 111.1 million housing 
units in the United States. The RECS data are classified by multiple geographical 
classifications: four census regions, nine census divisions, and the four most populous 
states (California, Florida, New York, and Texas). The RECS consists of two major parts: 
the household survey and the energy supplier survey. The household survey gathers 
information about the dwelling and many socioeconomic characteristics of each 
household. To obtain accurate and detailed measures of energy consumption, 
expenditures, and price data, EIA takes these data directly from the utilities serving the 
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individual households. The data are collected by questionnaires mailed to all the suppliers 
of the households in the household survey. Its variables comprise building type, fuel, end-
use, and technology categories. The end-use equipment combinations are used as control 
variables for the econometric analysis. For the long-run model, it is necessary to factor in 
technology choices for new and retiring equipment depending on capital costs, operating 
costs, and maintenance costs of competing end-use technologies.  
 The RECS is a national area-probability sample survey that collects energy-
related data for occupied primary housing units. The universe for the sample design of 
the RECS includes all housing units occupied as primary residences in the 50 states and 
the District of Columbia. The definition of ―household‖ is the same as that used by the 
U.S. Census Bureau. By definition, the RECS does not include vacant housing units, 
seasonal units, or second homes. The basic sample is designed to represent the total 
population of households for each of the nine census divisions in the United States. The 
sample design for the RECS is based on multistage area probability design. The universe 
is broken up into successively smaller and statistically selected areas. The process begins 
with the selection of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and ends with the selection of 
individual households. The total land area of the 50 states and the D.C. was divided into 
1,786 PSUs, based on county and independent city boundaries and on Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) defined in 1990. The primary mode of stratification of PSUs is 
by the nine census divisions. The strata are independently defined within census divisions 
for the four most populous states and for two states with unique weather conditions 
(Alaska and Hawaii). The stratification is also based on MSA or non-MSA status of 
PSUs and on dominant residential space-heating fuel and weather conditions.  The PSUs 
are grouped into 116 strata, with one PSU selected from each stratum. The Secondary 
Sampling Units (SSUs) consist of one or more census blocks, selected directly from 
census statistics. Blocks were combined as necessary to create SSUs that contained at 
least 50 housing units. The SSUs that contained very large numbers of housing units were 
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divided into smaller listing segments, and one listing segment is selected for detailed 
address listing. Specific addresses chosen from each of the field listings comprised the 
ultimate cluster of the RECS sample. An ultimate cluster of housing units to be contacted 
for interview was randomly selected from the penultimate cluster. These housing units 
constitute the assignments given to interviewers. 
 
3.2 Conventional Econometric Models (Models I and II) 
 To estimate how individual households respond to short-run price changes at the 
micro level, this study chooses to use log linear demand functions employed by 
Halvorsen (1975), Houthakker (1980), McClung (1988), and Dahl (1979). The literature 
revealed that demands on energy are normally influenced by fuel prices, household 
income and choice of equipment, and housing and demographic characteristics.  
This econometric analysis uses the EIA’s RECS data and employs the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation technique. As discussed previously in the methodology section, 
the log linear nature of the demand equation implies that the vector of estimated 
parameters represents the elasticities. Finally, the study defines the residential energy 
demand equation of a consumer as a function of fuel prices (own price and competing 
good’s price), income level, climate (heating degree-days [HDD] and cooling degree-
days [CDD]), and equipment type (see Equation 3.1 and Table 3.1):  
 
ln(QD) = α + β1 ln(PELEC) + β2 ln(PGAS) + β3 ln(income) + β4 ln(# of rooms)  
+ β5 ln(HDD) + β6 ln(CDD) + β7 (appliance holding dummies) + u     
[Equation 3.1] 
 
The short-run changes depend only on changes in consumption of energy services, 
whereas the long-run changes include greater alterations in the equipment’s energy 
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efficiency. Because the model controls for the equipment type with a set of dummy 
variables, the elasticity estimated by this equation is a short-run elasticity. Correlations 
among variables are presented in Appendix D.  
 
Table 3.1 List of Variables of Models I and II 
Variable 
Name 
Description Mean S.D. Min. Max. 




38,646 25,666 164 246,261 
PELEC1 Average electricity price by 
census division  
($/million Btu) 
 
30.5 5.8 23.1 41.9 
PELEC2 
 




31.2 13.9 9.1 127 
PGAS1 Average natural gas price by 
census division  
($/million Btu) 
 
13.5 1.7 11.2 16.1 




11.0 5.1 2.4 75 
INCOME Annual income 47,602 34,679 1,250* 120,000* 
      
NROOM Number of rooms 
 
2.8 1.1 0 8 
CDD Cooling degree-days 
 
1486.2 966.5 0 5518 
HDD Heating degree-days 
 
4311.2 2180.8 0 11,465 
EQUIPMENT A set of dummy variables 
classifying equipment type 
Table 3.2 provides descriptions of the dummy 
variables 
Number of observations = 4,382 
*The maximum and minimum levels of income could not be found, because the lowest category is ―below 
1,250‖ and the highest category is ―above 120,000.‖  
 
 McClung (1988) categorizes appliance holding alternatives into 1) gas space-and-
water heating with no central AC, 2) gas space-and-water heating with central air, 3) 
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electric space-and-water heating with central air, and 4) oil space-and-water heating 
without central air. Following McClung’s classification of alternatives, the appliance 
holding types of this study are classified according to two criteria: the type of fuel used 
for heating and the type of AC equipment. The heating fuel types are categorized into 
natural gas, electricity, and other fuels, and the AC systems are classified into central, 
individual, and combination central and individual systems. Table 3.2 shows that the 
combination of electric heating and central AC is adopted by 19% of the sample 
households and that the combination of natural- gas-based heating equipment and central 
AC is used by 28% of them. The group of households that have electric heating and 
central AC is chosen as a reference group, because it is anticipated to spend the most 
electricity. The choice of the reference group facilitates the interpretation of regression 
results. 
 
Table 3.2 List of Equipment Dummy Variables by Heating Fuel and AC Type 
 Variable Name  Heating Fuel/AC Type Frequency % 




Electricity/central AC 852 19.44 
 NGIND  Natural gas/individual AC 575 13.12 
 NG9  Natural gas/don’t know AC type 465 10.61 
 OTHERIND  Other fuel type/individual AC 358 8.17 
 ELECIND  Electricity/individual AC 241 5.5 
 OTHERCEN  Other fuel type/central AC 231 5.27 
 OTHER9  Other fuel type/don’t know AC type 190 4.34 
 ELEC9  Electricity/don’t know AC type 127 2.9 
 NGBOTH  Natural gas/both central and individual AC 31 0.71 
 ELECBOTH  Electricity/both central and individual AC 19 0.43 
 DONTKNOWIND  Don’t know heating fuel/individual AC 18 0.41 
 DONTKNOWCEN  Don’t know heating fuel/central AC 6 0.14 
 OTHERBOTH  Other fuel type/both central and individual 
AC 6 0.14 
 NOANSWER  No answer 35 0.8 
   Total    4,382 100 
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Model I: Elasticity Estimation with Census Division-level Average Energy Prices 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, Halvorsen (1975) simultaneously estimated price and 
demand with a two-stage model with the speculation that price and consumption interplay 
in the electricity market. In this study, model I includes only the demand function, 
because it uses the average price not the marginal price. This model assumes that price 
affects consumption, but not vice versa, because change in consumption of each 
household in a census division is very minimal so that it barely affects the change in the 
average division price. In other words, consumers in this model are price-takers. The 
average prices of electricity and natural gas to the residential consumers in each census 
division in 2005 were obtained from the EIA’s NEMS dataset and matched to the RECS 
dataset according to where each house is located. Particularly for larger divisions, there is 
some unavoidable imprecision in the data. The RECS dataset, open to the public, 
provides a variable to indicate the respondent’s census division of residence but no 
information about where the respondent lives within the census division. Consequently, 
the respondent is assumed to face the division-wide average prices of electricity and 
natural gas. 
 Table 3.3 shows that the own-price elasticity of residential electricity demand is 
found to be highly significant at –0.66 in the short run. It is in the range of the short-run 
price elasticities of residential electricity demand (from –0.97 to +0.57) collected by Dahl 
in 1993. This suggests that a 1% rise in price causes a reduction in demand by 0.66%. 
This interpretation of the estimated variable requires an assumption that the behavioral 
attributes of all of the households in the population are homogeneous. Reiss and White 
(2008) argued that short-run price elasticities of households in California are 
heterogeneous and that the differences are caused by the variety in appliance holdings. 
Since model I and Model II in this study controls the equipment variation by adding the 
appliance holding dummy variables, the homogeneity assumption is justified.  
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 On the other hand, the cross-price (natural gas) elasticity is found to be 0.45. This 
means that when a 1% increase in the electricity price results in the increase in 
consumption of a competing good, natural gas use increases by 0.45%. This result 
suggests that a substitution relationship exists between electricity and natural gas in the 
residential sector. When electricity prices go up continuously or stay at a high level for a 
long time, consumers may consider replacing their electricity-based heating equipment 
with natural-gas-based equipment.  
 The income elasticity is estimated to be 0.12, which indicates that a 1% increase 
in income is associated with a 0.12% rise in consumption. When the total income of a 
household increases, the income elasticity should be distinguished from the concept of 
price elasticity at different income levels. While the former indicates how consumers 
change their consumption levels as their incomes increase, the latter shows how 
sensitively consumers at different income levels respond to price changes. The sensitivity 
of consumers at different income levels is analyzed with separate models. 
 Table 3.3 also shows that when HDD increase by 1%, electricity consumption 
goes up by 0.03%. With a 1% increase in the number of CDD, consumption rises by 
0.08%. Compared to households that have electric heating and a central AC system (the 
reference group), households that have natural-gas-based heating systems use less 






















ln(electricity price) –0.663* 0.051 –13.010 0.000 
ln(natural gas price) 0.445* 0.076 5.870 0.000 








ln(income) 0.119* 0.010 11.880 0.000 
ln(# of rooms) 0.627* 0.022 28.610 0.000 
ln(HDD) 0.032* 0.012 2.610 0.009 
ln(CDD) 0.077* 0.013 6.000 0.000 













NGCEN –0.415* 0.025 –16.710 0.000 
NGIND –0.605* 0.031 –19.820 0.000 
NGBOTH –0.393* 0.095 –4.120 0.000 
NG9 –0.768* 0.035 –21.950 0.000 
ELECIND –0.046 0.040 –1.150 0.249 
ELECBOTH 0.167 0.121 1.380 0.167 
ELEC9 –0.156* 0.035 –4.470 0.000 
OTHERCEN –0.155* 0.039 –3.960 0.000 
OTHERIND –0.444* 0.036 –12.500 0.000 
OTHERBOTH 0.198 0.213 0.930 0.352 
OTHER9 –0.502* 0.045 –11.220 0.000 
     
 
 
Constant 9.161* 0.292 31.370 0.000 
R-squared = 0.4326 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.4304 
Number of observations = 4271 
*Significant at the 99% confidence level 
 
 
 In order to check if there are any model specification errors, this study performed 
the Ramsey regression specification error test (RESET) for omitted variables. 
 
Ramsey RESET using powers of the fitted values of ln (electricity use) 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
  F(3, 4250) =      1.64  
Prob > F =      0.1790 
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The p-value for the Ramsey RESET is greater than 0.05. This indicates that the Ramsey 
RESET failed to reject the null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variable. 
According to the test result, this study can conclude that the model is specified correctly. 
 In addition to the RESET, this study checked multicollinearity among variables 
with the variance inflation factor (VIF). As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF value 
is greater than 10 may merit further investigation.  Table 3.4 indicates that there is no 
variable suspected to cause a multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 3.4 Variance Inflation Factor of Model I 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
NGCEN 2 0.499175 
LNCD65 1.88 0.530669 
NG9 1.76 0.569607 
NGIND 1.69 0.591614 
LNHD65 1.64 0.608153 
OTHERIND 1.51 0.66304 
LNELECPRICE 1.37 0.727977 
LNNGPRICE 1.34 0.745137 
OTHER9 1.33 0.753607 
ELECIND 1.28 0.78342 
LNHHINCOME 1.25 0.802227 
OTHERCEN 1.25 0.802533 
LNBEDROOMS 1.23 0.815073 
ELEC9 1.23 0.81538 
NGBOTH 1.04 0.96114 
ELECBOTH 1.02 0.97969 
OTHERBOTH 1.01 0.987143 
Mean VIF 1.4 
  
One of the main assumptions for the OLS regression is the homogeneity of variance of 
the residuals. According to the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity, 
the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogeneous is rejected.  
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Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity 
Ho: constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of ln (electricity use) 
Chi
2
(1) = 70.06 
Prob>Chi
2
 = 0.0000 
 
 However, homoscedasticity tests are very sensitive to model assumptions such as 
the assumption of normality. Therefore, it is common practice to combine the tests with 
diagnostic plots to make a judgment on the severity of the heteroskedasticity and to 
decide if any correction is need for heteroscedasticity. If the model is well-fitted, there 
should be no pattern to the residuals plotted against the fitted values. This study then 
graphically checked the homoscedasticity of residuals. The plot in Figure 3.1 does not 
show any specific pattern. This means that there is no evidence to conclude that the 
residual variance is heteroscedastic. In other words, because no pattern is detected in the 
plot, this study concludes that the model satisfies the homoscedasticity assumption. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals for Model I 
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 Diverse income groups can have different behavioral responses to changes in fuel 
prices. Variations in price elasticity have been analyzed specially with gasoline demand 
for the transportation sector, whereas there have been few studies to analyze such 
research questions for the residential buildings sector. Two opposite groups of arguments 
about the diversity of price responsiveness across different income quintiles coexist. One 
argument states that lower-income households may be more sensitive to price changes 
and have a tendency to switch modes easily, resulting in a higher than average price 
elasticity (West and Williams, 2004). On the other hand, another argument states that 
lower-income households may already minimize their energy use because of their budget 
constraints, and for that reason, they may be unable to reduce their energy use further, 
resulting in a lower price elasticity than average (Kayser, 2000). Higher-income 
households may be less sensitive to price changes because the share of the electricity bill 
to their total expenditures would be relatively small, so they would care about electricity 
price increases less than low-income households (Robinson, 1969). However, higher-
income households may have more options to reduce energy use because some portions 
of their consumption may be discretionary rather than necessary (Kayer, 2000). All of 
these various arguments suggest that substantial potential heterogeneity among income 
groups exists (Wadud et al., 2010).  
 This study includes an interaction term between price and income, ln(electricity 
price) * ln(income) to examine the heterogeneity in price elasticity among different 
income levels: 
 
ln(electricity use) = α + β1 ln(electricity price) + β2 ln(natural gas price) +  
β3 ln(income) + β4  ln(electricity price) * ln(income) + β5 ln(# of rooms) + β6 




Table 3.5 shows that heterogeneity in price elasticity across different income levels is not 
supported by the regression result (the p-value of the interaction term is 0.202). 
 
Table 3.5 Heterogeneity in Price Elasticity of Electricity Demand  
Dependent 
Variable ln(electricity use) Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Interaction term ln(elec. price)*ln(income) 0.063 0.050 1.280 0.202 
      
Price variables 
ln(electricity price) –1.321* 0.518 –2.550 0.011 
ln(natural gas price) 0.443** 0.076 5.840 0.000 
 





ln(income) –0.10 0.169 –0.570 0.568 
ln(# of rooms) 0.63** 0.022 28.560 0.000 
ln(HDD) 0.03** 0.012 2.660 0.008 
ln(CDD) 0.08** 0.013 6.030 0.000 




NGCEN –0.36** 0.023 –15.57 0.000 
NGIND –0.51** 0.028 –17.82 0.000 
NGBOTH –0.32** 0.089 –3.57 0.000 
NG9 –0.67** 0.032 –20.91 0.000 
ELECIND –0.07 0.037 –1.870 0.062 
ELECBOTH 0.12 0.118 1.01 0.314 
ELEC9 –0.16** 0.032 –4.84 0.000 
OTHERCEN –0.08* 0.037 –2.32 0.020 
OTHERIND –0.30** 0.033 –8.97 0.000 
OTHERBOTH 0.24 0.196 1.18 0.236 
OTHER9 –0.35** 0.042 –8.35 0.000 
 
      _Constant 5.12** 0.257 19.92 0.000 
R-squared = 0.5051 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.5031 
Number of observations = 4240 
*Significant at the 95% confidence level 
** Significant at the 99% confidence level 
 
 However, there is a great difference in price elasticity between extremely low and 
extremely high income groups. To show how differently low- and high-income 
households react to price increases, this study estimated the price elasticity of the two 
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income groups separately.  Households that earn less than $10,000 a year are included in 
the low-income group, and those that earn greater than $100,000 per year are defined as 
the high-income group. Table 3.6 shows that the price elasticity of the low-income 
households (–0.67) is about three times greater than that of the high-income households 
(–0.21). This result supports Robinson’s (1969) argument that wealthier households are 
less sensitive to price changes than low-income households. 
 
Table 3.6 Elasticity Variations for Different Income Groups 
Income Level Annual Income Range Price 
Elasticity 
Number of Observations 
Low income Less than $10,000 –0.67 439 (bottom 10%) 
High income Greater than $100,000 –0.21 537 (top 12%) 
 
In addition, this study conducted the same exercise with RECS 1997 data and found that 
the price elasticity was –0.96. Differences in economic situations would affect the 
difference between the elasticities of 1997 and 2005. Detailed results are provided in 
Appendix E. 
 
Model II: Elasticity Estimation with Derived Observation-specific Average Prices 
 The price elasticity of demand was estimated with the derived observation-
specific average electricity price by household. As mentioned previously, one concern of 
model I is that when estimating the elasticity with census division-level average prices, 
their variation is not sufficient to analyze the responsiveness of demand with respect to 
the prices. In order to solve this problem, model II uses household-level energy prices 









  Annual electricity expenditure in dollar  
3
  Annual natural gas expenditure in dollar  
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). The observation-specific 
price of electricity is derived by a calculation of the annual electricity bill divided by the 
annual electricity consumption. That of natural gas is derived from the same formula. 
Table 3.7 shows that using model II, the short-run price elasticity of residential electricity 
demand is found to be –0.81 at the 99% confidence level. 
 
Table 3.7 Electricity Demand Parameter Estimates of Model II 
Dependent Variable ln(electricity use) Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>|t| 





ln(electricity price) –0.811* 0.028 –28.890 0.000 
ln(natural gas price) –0.022 0.032 –0.690 0.492 








ln(income) 0.136* 0.009 14.460 0.000 
ln(# of rooms) 0.566* 0.021 27.520 0.000 
ln(heating degree days) –0.013 0.012 –1.140 0.255 
ln(cooling degree days) 0.104* 0.012 8.810 0.000 













NGCEN –0.356* 0.023 –15.570 0.000 
NGIND –0.506* 0.028 –17.820 0.000 
NGBOTH –0.317* 0.089 –3.570 0.000 
NG9 –0.675* 0.032 –20.910 0.000 
ELECIND –0.069 0.037 –1.870 0.062 
ELECBOTH 0.119 0.118 1.010 0.314 
ELEC9 –0.156* 0.032 –4.840 0.000 
OTHERCEN –0.086 0.037 –2.320 0.020 
OTHERIND –0.297* 0.033 –8.970 0.000 
OTHERBOTH 0.235 0.199 1.180 0.236 
OTHER9 –0.351* 0.042 –8.350 0.000 
     
 
 
Constant 5.119* 0.257 19.920 0.000 
R-squared = 0.5051 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.5031 
Number of observations = 4240 
*Significant at the 99% confidence level 




  Annual electricity consumption in Btu 
5
  Annual natural gas consumption in Btu 
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 As was done, this model was diagnosed in various ways. The RESET was 
performed for checking omitted variables and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity. The heteroscedasticity is checked in a graphical way too. In addition, 
multicollinearity was checked with the VIF factor. The p-value for Ramsey’s RESET is 
less than 0.05. This indicates that the Ramsey RESET rejects the null hypothesis that the 
model has no omitted variables. This means the model could be misspecified. The use of 
micro-level prices rather than macro-level prices in model specification basically means 
that the price affects each household’s demand and that at the same time, a change in the 
demand has an impact determining the price that the consumer is given under the today’s 
block pricing system. Halvorsen (1975) employed a simultaneous equation model to 
include the demand and price equations at the same time. He used marginal electricity 
prices in the demand equation and the prices influenced by the electricity generation and 
other market conditions of the area where each household is located. For that reason, he 
added the percentage of generation produced by publicly owned utilities, the cost of fuel 
per kilowatt-hour of generation, the percentage of population living in rural areas, the 
ratio of total industrial sales to total residential sales, and the cost of labor in the price 
equation. The RESET tests for Model I and Model II indicate that the use of division 
level average prices in the previous model fits the RECS data and the equation specified 
(Equation 3.1) better than the household level average prices. 
 In addition to the RESET, this study checked multicollinearity among variables 
with the VIF. The mean value of VIF was 1.36, which indicates that there is no variable 
suspected to cause a multicollinearity problem. As mentioned previously, the null 
hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity is that the 
variance of the residuals is homogeneous. This is rejected at the 99% confidence level 
(Prob>Chi
2 
= 0.0000). However, homoscedasticity tests are very sensitive to model 
assumptions such as the assumption of normality. Therefore, this study combined the test 
with diagnostic plots to make a judgment on the severity of the heteroscedasticity and to 
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decide whether any correction is need for heteroscedasticity. This study graphically 
checked the homoscedasticity of residuals. The plot in Figure 3.2 shows no pattern of the 
data points. This indicates that there is no evidence to conclude that the residual variance 
is heteroscedastic. In other words, because no pattern is detected in the plot, this study 
concludes that the model satisfies the homoscedasticity assumption. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals for Model II 
 
3.3 Discrete/Continuous Choice Model (Model III) 
 This section specifies a unified model of the demand for electricity consistent 
with discrete choice of appliances in particular its ability to account for the 
interdependency between the appliance choice and the demand for residential electricity 
(Dubin & McFadden, 1984; Vaage, 2000). Many micro-simulation studies have 
attempted to model jointly the demand for appliances and the demand for electricity by 
the appliances (Dubin & McFadden, 1984).  
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 Since the 1908s, there have been some arguments that it is important to clarify the 
exogeneity of appliance dummy variables used in the conventional models. Because the 
demand for durables (appliances) and their uses are related decisions by the consumer, 
specifications that ignore this fact will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of price 
elasticities (Dubin & McFadden, 1984). In the case of the purchase and the use of an air 
conditioner, an unobserved effect that is captured in the error term in the electricity 
demand equation (e.g., poor natural ventilation in a housing unit) may increase the 
electricity consumption. At the same time, the unobserved effect is likely to increase the 
probability of selection of the central AC system. In this case, OLS estimation of the 
electricity demand equation includes a classical bias due to correlation of an explanatory 
variable and the equation error. In order to solve this problem, this model uses a set of 
instrumental variables (IV)
6
 that replace dummy variables that may not be exogenous and 
correlated with the error term in Equation 3.1. In this model, the probabilities for 
appliance portfolios to be selected by households are used instead of the appliance 
holding dummies. In other words, the expected probability for each alternative chosen by 
the household from the discrete choice model is used as an instrument for the appliance 
holding dummies used in the previous models. Appliance holding decisions are analyzed 











 An instrument is a variable that does not itself belong in the explanatory equation and is correlated with 
the endogenous explanatory variables, conditional on the other covariates. 
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Stage I: Heating and Cooling Equipment Choice (Discrete Choice) Model  
 In the discrete choice model, I specify that each household faces five different 
heating-cooling systems: ELECCEN, NGCEN, ELECIND, NGIND, and OTHERS.
7
 The 
percentage shares for the different alternatives are 19%, 28%, 6%, 13%, and 34%, 
respectively. The heating-cooling system variable (nominal variable) is used as the 
dependent variable. Independent variables included in this discrete choice model are 
annual operating cost for heating and cooling, capital cost for heating and cooling 
equipment, average prices of electricity and natural gas by census division, and annual 
income. Table 3.8 gives the variables used in the choice model and their sample mean by 
alternative. 
 
Table 3.8 Variables in the Heating-Cooling Choice Model 




NGCEN ELECIND NGIND OTHERS 
Annual operating cost 
for heating ($) 
HOPCOST* 564 855 437 989 678 
Annual operating cost 
for cooling ($) 
COPCOST 384 280 117 129 88 
Capital cost for 
heating ($) 
HKCOST 3,435 3,500 3,342 3,637 3,465 
Capital cost for 
cooling ($) 
CKCOST 2,574 2,574 511 511 1,454 
Average price of 
electricity  
($/million Btu) 
AELECP 28 29 30 33 33 
Average price of 
natural gas  
($/million Btu) 
ANGP 14 13 13 14 13 
Annual income ($) INCOME 47,565 59,474 29,979 35,478 45,345 
* HOPCOST includes space heating and water heating together.  
 
 




 ELECCEN = electric heating and central AC, NGCEN = natural-gas-based heating and central AC, 
ELECIND = electric heating and individual AC, NGIND = natural gas heating and individual AC, and  
Others = other heating-cooling systems. 
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 As Vaage (2000) pointed out, an obvious limitation of the discrete/continuous 
model with cross-sectional data is lack of data on capital costs. The RECS data do not 
include the information about the initial capital costs spent to install heating and cooling 
systems in the houses when they are built, because the RECS questions were asked to the 
current residents in those houses, not to the builders who actually know installation cost 
information. The only information allowing inference of the capital costs of the heating 
and cooling equipment are the COOLTYPE and EQUIPM variables in the RECS. 
COOLTYPE explains what kind of air-conditioning equipment the home has: central AC, 
individual AC, or both. EQUIPM means the type of heating equipment that provides 
most of the heat for the home. EQUIPM is categorized into heat pump, central warm-air 
furnace, steam/hot water system with radiators, built-in electric units, built-in pipeless 
furnace, built-in heater burning wood/coal/coke, portable electric heaters, portable 
kerosene heaters, fireplace, cook stove, some other equipment, and no heating equipment. 
 To solve this data problem, this study assumed that real capital costs evolve 
slowly enough that contemporary real prices reflect costs at the date of acquisition, 
following McClung’s (1988) assumptions. Average energy fuel prices by census division 
were used rather than marginal prices in the first stage of the discrete choice model, since 
it was assumed that when they purchase appliances, consumers consider today’s energy 
price levels broadly rather than considering marginal price changes in the future 
thoroughly. A multinomial logit model with maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) was 
run to estimate the expected probability for each option chosen by the household. To 
identify the choice specific parameters, one of the alternatives was used as the base 
category; this study used ELECCEN because the electricity-based heating and the central 
AC system are the most electricity-intensive systems for heating and cooling.  
 Results from the estimation of the model are reported in Table 3.9. The 
coefficients show the change in the log-odds of being in each category of the dependent 
variable relative to the base category from a one-unit increase in each independent 
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variable, holding the other variables constant. According to the straightforward 
interpretation of the coefficients, the estimated coefficients of the COPCOST for the 
ELECIND category, –0.00286, for instance, is interpreted as follows. When the operating 
cost for cooling increases by $1, the log-odds of the ELECIND category relative to 
ELECCEN decrease by 0.00286. When the operating cost for heating (HOPCOST) 
increases, the natural-gas-based heating systems (NGCEN and NGIND) are less likely to 
be chosen than the reference group (ELECCEN). When the operating cost for cooling 
(COPCOST) increases, ELECCEN becomes the most popular option among the five for 
heating and cooling. This is because every coefficient by alternative is negative for this 
variable. In other words, when the operating cost for cooling increases, it is more 
probable for a household to choose a central AC system over an individual AC system. 
As for the estimate average natural gas coefficient (ANGP), high natural gas prices 
appear to increase the probability of choosing ELECCEN as the heating and cooling 
equipment. AELECP for NGCEN, 0.05061, means that when the electricity price goes up, 
households are more likely to select natural-gas-based heating over the electric heating 
system. The INCOME coefficient for the NGCEN category shows that the natural-gas-
based heating and the central AC system are popular among higher-income households. 
This fact is supported by Table 3.8 as well. The descriptive statistics in the table show 






Table 3.9 Estimated Coefficients, the Discrete Appliance Choice of Model II 
(Alternatives: ELECCEN (reference group), NGCEN, ELECIND, NGIND, and OTHERS) 
Variable Choice Coefficient Std. Err. p-value 
HOPCOST NGCEN –9.5E-05* 1.52E-05 0.000 
 ELECIND 2.76E-06 3.33E-06 0.407 
 NGIND –8.5E-05* 1.29E-05 0.000 
 OTHERS –1.69E-07 1.75E-06 0.923 
     
COPCOST NGCEN –0.00149* 0.000238 0.000 
 ELECIND –0.00286* 0.000969 0.003 
 NGIND –0.0033* 0.000888 0.000 
 OTHERS –0.00166* 0.000312 0.000 
     
HKCOST NGCEN 0.005932* 0.001278 0.000 
 ELECIND –0.0004 0.000306 0.187 
 NGIND –0.00025 0.000561 0.658 
 OTHERS –0.00046 0.000235 0.050 
     
CKCOST NGCEN 0.000916 0.000379 0.016 
 ELECIND –0.01424* 0.003015 0.000 
 NGIND –0.01502* 0.004376 0.001 
 OTHERS –0.0023* 0.000233 0.000 
     
INCOME NGCEN 5.79E-06* 2.18E-06 0.008 
 ELECIND –3.35E-06 4.33E-06 0.439 
 NGIND 1.07E-05 4.65E-06 0.021 
 OTHERS 4.54E-06 2.13E-06 0.033 
     
AELECP NGCEN 0.050601* 0.017423 0.004 
 ELECIND 0.00133 0.022634 0.953 
 NGIND –0.01314 0.030029 0.662 
 OTHERS 0.096108* 0.014758 0.000 
     
ANGP NGCEN –0.17084* 0.048314 0.000 
 ELECIND –0.45572* 0.081959 0.000 
 NGIND –0.21107 0.116534 0.070 
 OTHERS –0.19063* 0.043995 0.000 
Number of observations   =       3386 
LR Chi
2
(28)     =    6415.26 
Prob > Chi
2
     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2
       =     0.6404 
a. The choice-specific coefficients are relative to the base category, 
ELECCEN. 
b. Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of Ho: all coefficients but the constant 




Stage II: Electricity Consumption (Continuous Choice) Model 
 As model I and model II specified, observation-specific energy prices, income, 
number of rooms, HDD, and CDD are included in the continuous choice model. The 
main difference of this model from the previous two models is including the expected 









) rather than the set of dummy variables showing the current equipment 
holdings. The variables except the choice probability terms are transformed to logs. This 
model found that the price elasticity of residential electricity demand is –0.78. This value 
is between the estimates from the two previous OLS models (–0.66 and –0.81). 
Compared to the second OLS model using observation-specific energy prices ( = –0.81), 
this continuous/discrete choice model shows less elastic demand.  Because the income 
variable is used both in the discrete choice model and in this continuous choice model, it 
is allowed to influence the energy demand directly; this is measured by their respective 
parameter estimates and indirectly through their effects on the selection terms. Finally the 
potential (direct) impact from income is tested in this model. Table 3.10 reports the 
estimated coefficients from this continuous choice model.  
 The reported elasticity is not the universally correct number, but it is noteworthy 
that it does not reject the hypothesis of long-term optimization. This model includes 
probability terms to take into account the possible impacts from the appliance choice on 
electricity demand. Because the assumption of joint optimization is proved to be correct 
by this model, the omission of this variable in the standard OLS models may imply a 
misspecification bias. 
 




  The expected probability for the natural-gas heating and central AC to be selected for each household 
9
  The expected probability for the electric heating and individual AC to be selected for each household 
10
 The expected probability for the natural-gas heating and individual AC to be selected for each household 
11
 The expected probability for other heating-cooling systems to be selected for each household 
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Table 3.10 Estimated Coefficients, the Conditional Energy Demand of Model III 
ln(electricity use) 
                
Coefficient 
     Std. 
Err.   t 
    p-
value 
ln(electricity price) –0.777* 0.032 –24.630 0.000 
ln(natural gas price) 0.086 0.034 2.500 0.012 
ln(income) 0.150* 0.010 14.330 0.000 
ln(# of rooms) 0.530* 0.022 23.590 0.000 
ln(HDD) 0.000 0.016 0.020 0.981 
ln(CDD) 0.172* 0.019 8.850 0.000 
PRNGCEN –0.593* 0.034 –17.530 0.000 
PRELECIND –0.145 0.063 –2.300 0.022 
PRNGIND –0.733* 0.038 –19.340 0.000 
PROTHERS –0.517* 0.067 –7.690 0.000 
Constant 5.186* 0.328 15.820 0.000 
Number of observations =  3315 
Prob > F   =  0.0000 
R
2
   =  0.5148 
Adjusted R
2
 =  0.5133 
Root MSE   =  0.45845 
 
3.4 Comparisons among the Three Models 
 As mentioned previously in this chapter, the main purpose of estimating price 
elasticity in this study is to examine how the short-run demand responsiveness to changes 
in price influences the long-run demand projections. The short-run price elasticity 
basically reflects how consumers adjust to changes in price without any consideration of 
equipment shift. Because model I and model II controlled for the technology shift with 
the use of appliance holding dummies, they are interpreted as short-run price elasticities. 
Then, is the elasticity in the discrete/continuous choice model most naturally interpreted 
as a short- or long-term estimate? As discussed in Chapter 2, when the demand is limited 
(fixed) by the available stock of installation, the response to a price change is a short-run 
response. On the other hand, when the appliance has been optimally adapted to new 
conditions and the response to the price change is affected by the optimized new 
conditions, it is a long-term response (Vaage, 2000). The continuous/discrete choice 
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model explicitly modeled the joint optimization of appliance and appliance use. Thus, the 
derived estimate must be interpreted as a long-term effect. Thus, either Model I or Model 
II should be used to estimate the short-run price elasticity for NEMS experiments in 
Chapter 6. 
 First of all, in terms of R
2
, the continuous/discrete choice model (model III) 
shows the best fit to the data (Table 3.11). It was found that the electricity price (either 
census-division price or household-level price) the annual income and the number of 
rooms affect the determination of the level of electricity consumption significantly. The 
2005 RECS data detailed information about American households’ energy consumption. 
This rich source of micro-level data complements the existing econometric analysis based 
on time series data. Time series studies lack information concerning appliance stock, 
building characteristics, differences in climates, and demographic characteristics and are 
usually aggregates over the entire nation’s or region’s data. The use of this cross-
sectional data, however, allows researchers to consider the interventions across the 
households; thus, the cross-sectional data was used for this analysis.  
 Last, model II and model III use observation specific energy prices, and they 
show relatively more elastic demand than the first model with average prices. This means 
that consumers are more responsive to prices they face on their bills rather than to 
regional average prices. However, it was found that there may be a misspecification 
problem in the use of observation-specific prices, as discussed in Section 3.2. To solve 
the misspecification problem, the involvement of the supply function or the price 
function including some information about the supply is required. 
 Model III includes probability terms to take into account the possible impacts 
from the appliance choice on electricity demand. Because the probability terms are 
statistically significant, this model shows that the assumption of joint optimization of 
appliance choice and appliance use is a legitimate assumption. However, the estimates 
from the conventional models are appropriate for the NEMS experiments in Chapter 6, 
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because NEMS uses only short-term price elasticities to adjust its long-term forecasts. 
Puller and Greening (1999) also argue that they believe that their single continuous 
analysis is not without good foundation because many of the short-run adjustments are 
continuous choice only, although a more complete model would incorporate discrete 
choices. The first two OLS models do not allow changes in appliance choice of the 
households, so that they can be interpreted as short-run price elasticities needed for the 
next phase of this study. Considering the issue of possible misspecification error in model 




Table 3.11 Summary of Estimated Electricity Demand Models 
Dependent Variable 
ln(electricity use) 



















   ln(electricity price) –0.663* –0.811* –0.777* 
ln(natural gas price) 0.445* –0.022 0.086 
    ln(income) 0.119* 0.136* 0.150* 
ln(# of rooms) 0.627* 0.566* 0.530* 
ln(HDD) 0.032* –0.013 0.000 
ln(CDD) 0.077* 0.104* 0.172* 
    NGCEN –0.415* –0.356* 
 NGIND –0.605* –0.506* 
 NGBOTH –0.393* –0.317* 
 NG9 –0.768* –0.675* 
 ELECIND –0.046 –0.069 
 ELECBOTH 0.167 0.119 
 ELEC9 –0.156* –0.156* 
 OTHERCEN –0.155* –0.086 
 OTHERIND –0.444* –0.297* 
 OTHERBOTH 0.198 0.235 
 OTHER9 –0.502* –0.351* 
 












    Constant 9.161* 5.119* 5.186* 
R
2 0.433 0.505 0.515 
                            *Significant at the 99% confidence level 
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CHAPTER 4  
ENERGY CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
 
 Economics as well as other behavioral sciences such as psychology and sociology 
have suggested various and interesting views of energy consumer behavior. A broader 
approach to energy efficiency and conservation policy could motivate consumers to save 
residential energy. Some behavioral scientists argue that small changes in the context, so 
called ―nudges,‖ could affect as much as large price changes. This suggests a potential 
role for non-price intervention. Insights from economic and non economic behavioral 
sciences may contribute to developing informational programs for energy conservation. 
Recently, utility companies and public agencies have utilized the behavioral science 
research for shifting electricity loads, conserving energy, and enhancing technological 
innovation.  
The behavioral scientists have been interested in not only the rational but also the 
irrational side of human behaviors. They point out that people sometimes procrastinate 
and that their attention and interests wander (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010). These 
peripheral factors subconsciously influence consumers’ perceptions and decisions, which 
influence real-world outcomes. Many previous studies suggest that people fail to adopt 
advanced technologies that would save them money by using less energy, such as better 
insulation, fuel-efficient vehicles, and efficient appliances and lighting. It is because 
people often resist actions that have clear long-term benefits if they perceive them 
unpleasantly in the short run. Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) explains this phenomenon 
with an interesting example like follows. People do not exercise regularly because of the 
short-term inconvenience or discomfort even though they know the regular work-out 
would turn out a healthy and well-shaped body in the end. A recent New York Times 
article shows an interesting behavior of consumers (in terms of energy savings) in the 
home electronics market:  
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Each year millions of Americans with old, inefficient refrigerators in their 
kitchens buy new, energy-saving ones. That may sound like an efficiency boon, 
but what’s vexing efficiency advocates is that an increasing number of consumers 
don’t actually get rid of the old fridge. A large number of older refrigerators still 
remain on the grid, even when swapped for more energy-efficient models. 
Unplugging the 29.6 million secondary units nationwide that are candidates for 
retirement would save 25 million megawatt hours of electricity, or about $2.8 
billion, the energy department study reported (Vestel, 2010). 
  
The Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future study (Brown et al., 2001) show that the 
U.S. economy could reduce residential energy consumption by up to 20 percent in 2020 
solely by adopting energy-efficient and clean technologies. Similarly, a McKinsey report 
released in 2009 points out that many households and businesses in the U.S. are not 
energy efficient, even though they could reduce energy consumption by 23% from the 
baseline by making them so. The amount of saved energy is equivalent to $1.2 trillion at 
an upfront cost of $520 billion (Granade et al., 2009). Of course, various factors affect 
this phenomenon, and more evidence is needed, but some barriers may come from 
insufficient information about energy efficiency and the imperfect rationality of 
consumers. Nolan and his colleagues (2008) argue that households could reduce their 
electricity consumption by 3% on average and lower carbon dioxide emissions from 
electric power by 0.5% only if they were provided with home energy-use reports to 
inform them of tips for saving energy.  
 This chapter discusses economic, psychological, and sociological concepts 
underlying consumer behavior in energy efficiency and conservation. Market and 
behavioral failures, psychological nudges, information problems relevant to energy 
efficiency are the main themes of the discussion. 
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4.1 Energy Market Failure  
Energy market failure can be explained with the ―energy efficiency gap‖ between 
the observed level of energy efficiency and some notion of optimal energy use (Hirst and 
Brown, 1990; Jaffe et al., 2004; Gillingham et al., 2009). Maximizing economic 
efficiency, which is generally considered as maximizing the net benefits to society, does 
not imply maximizing physical energy efficiency (Gillingham et al., 2009). One of the 
reasons the socially optimal level of efficiency will not be achieved is that implicit 
discount rates for consumers are higher than actual discount rates in the market. Thus, 
consumers weigh present and visible cash flows against uncertain future flows. The gap 
between economic energy efficiency and technical (physical) energy efficiency could 
occur as a result of hidden costs, such as search costs (Jaffe et al., 2004), or with the 
irreversibility of energy efficiency investments (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993, 1995; van 
Soest and Bulte, 2000). 
Energy market failure can be explained from other concepts of environmental 
externalities and imperfect information that lead to deviations from benefit maximization 
(or cost minimization). The main theme in energy market failures is that energy prices 
could not convey the true marginal social cost of energy consumption correctly because 
of environmental externalities and average-cost pricing (Gillingham et al., 2009). When a 
scarce environmental good, such as cleanliness of air, is considered as a public good and 
not a common good which is traded in the market, an externality occurs. The externality 
leads to an underinvestment in energy efficiency and hence results in an overuse of 
energy. To the extent that electricity prices do not internalize the externalities related to 
greenhouse gas emissions and water pollution from the electric power sector, the rate of 
energy efficiency adoption would be lower than the socially optimal level. In addition to 
unpriced environmental externalities, imperfect or missing information of products’ 
energy intensity would tend to lower the relative price of energy (fuels) to technology 
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adoption in energy production in a household
12
, leading finally to choices of low energy 
efficiency.  
On the other hand, there exist positive externalities associated with learning by 
using, and the experience and knowledge absorbed by consumers motivates them to 
adopt additional efficient equipment or for non-participants to join energy-efficiency 
programs and purchase energy-efficient appliances (Gillingham et al., 2009). Program 
spillovers occur when participating households install additional energy-efficient 
products voluntarily, and without any additional rebates, as a result of the knowledge and 
experience they have absorbed through participating in the program. An early adopter of 
a new energy-efficient product builds knowledge about the product through its use, and 
others benefit from the information about the existence, attributes, and performance of 
the products. Customer reviews available online are a good example of these positive 
externalities. Some studies have named learning-by-doing spillovers as ―free drivers‖ in 
the context of demand-side management programs (Blumstein and Harris, 1993; Eto et al., 
1996). Free drivers are nonparticipants who purchase and install energy-efficient 
products as a result of hearing about them from program participants. 
 
4.2 Behavioral Failure 
 The psychology, sociology, and even economics literatures have drawn attention 
to several systematic biases in consumer decision making in energy use and investment in 
energy efficiency. Arguments about behavioral failure depart from the neoclassical 
economic assumption about consumers: perfect rationality. Thus, the crucial and main 
question is whether the deviations from the perfect rationality lead to significant 




 The conception of relative price of energy (fuels) to technology adoption  is explained in Figure 2.1 in 
Chapter 2.  
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systematic biases in energy efficiency decision making and, if so, whether these biases 
lead to under- or overinvestment in energy efficiency (Gillingham et al., 2009).  
Bounded rationality suggests that consumers are rational but face cognitive 
constraints in processing information, which leads to deviations from rationality in 
certain circumstances (Simon 1959, 1986). Empirically testing the bounded rationality of 
energy consumers is difficult in that there are limited models of bounded rationality 
applicable to energy decision making (Sanstad and Howarth, 1994; Gillingham et al., 
2009). Kempton and Montgomery (1982) argue that consumers tend to use a simple 
payback measure derived from a simple calculation: the total investment cost divided by 
the future savings, calculated using the energy price at the moment of the calculation 
rather than the price at the time of the actual savings. According to this argument, 
consumers ignore future changes in real fuel prices for convenience in calculation. 
Kempton et al. (1992) empirically find that consumers systematically miscalculate 
payback for air conditioner investments, and the miscalculation results in 
overconsumption of electricity. Yates and Aronson (1985) point out that there is a 
salience effect in decision making. The salience effect means that consumers attach 
disproportionate weight to the most psychologically vivid and currently observable 
factors among various determinants. The salience effect may explain bounded rational 
behaviors in energy efficiency decisions, such as an overemphasis on the initial cost of an 
energy-efficient purchase, which leads to an underinvestment in energy-efficient 
equipment (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007). 
Heuristic decision-making theory basically assumes bounded rationality and 
explains a variety of decision-making strategies different from critical ways used in 
conventional utility maximization. According to this theory, consumers use simple 
heuristic techniques to determine their energy consumption levels in order to reduce the 
cognitive burden, and this behavioral feature systematically leads to an underinvestment 
in energy efficiency. Tversky (1972) argues that consumers use a sequential decision-
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making process by which they first narrow their full choices down to a smaller set by 
eliminating products that cost above a certain level.  
Furthermore, there have been some controversies around the effectiveness of the 
energy efficiency policies. Some people argue that the policies for reducing carbon 
emissions and for saving energy might actually increase overall energy consumption—a 
side effect called the ―rebound‖ or ―takeback‖ effect, which might be caused either by 
unintended wastes or by energy consumers’ behavioral changes (Dinan, 1989; Laitner, 
2000). The demand for energy services may increase in response to the declined marginal 
cost for operating the efficient equipment. As the efficiency of heating equipment and 
housing structures improves, homeowners may choose to maintain higher indoor 
temperature levels because the price of heating becomes relatively less due to the 
improved efficiency.  
 
4.3 Information Problems 
There has been a skeptical view of informational and educational programs in that 
there have been very few studies empirically measuring the exact magnitude of their 
effectiveness. Moreover, the evidence of their effectiveness is mixed because the 
programs vary in implementation and evaluation. Weil and McMahon (2003) argue that 
product labeling requirements are successful in increasing energy-efficient investments 
and offered anecdotal evidence. Newell and his colleagues (1999) empirically find that 
the responsiveness of energy efficiency innovation to energy prices had grown 
substantially since product labeling was required, whereas Levine and his colleagues 
(1995) argue that the Energy Guide product labeling requirements were fairly ineffective.  
Whether they support the effectiveness of the informational programs or not, 
experts and scholars have agreed on that information problems are the primary 
explanations for the energy-efficiency gap (Sanstad et al., 2006). Gillingham and his 
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colleagues (2009) point out that consumers’ lack of information about the availability of 
and savings from energy-efficient products and principal-agent (split-incentive) problems 
are often given as reasons why consumers systematically under-invest in energy 
efficiency. The main idea is that consumers often do not have sufficient information 
about new and efficient equipment or about the differences in future operating costs 
between existing and newly introduced products in the market, even though such 
information is necessary to make proper investment decisions (Howarth and Sanstad, 
1995). These information problems can be lightened by labeling and other information 
programs. Ek and Soderholm (2010) find that costs, environmental attitudes, and social 
interactions are important determinants of electricity saving activities within Swedish 
households. They test a hypothesis that information about available savings measures that 
is presented in a more concrete and specific way is more likely to affect behavior than is 
more general information. 
Economic theories about principal-agent problems are often involved to explain that 
the split incentive causes underinvestment in energy efficiency. The agent, such as a 
builder or landlord, decides the level of energy efficiency in a building, while the 
principal, such as the purchaser or tenant, pays the energy bills. Because the person who 
installs energy efficient technologies could not be the same person who uses them, it is 
possible that information asymmetry about the energy efficiency of the building exists. 
Thus, the agent may not be able to get back the costs of energy efficiency. Similarly, 
many builders hesitate to adopt green building practices because they know that higher 
up-front expenditures would raise the sales values. Builders under-emphasize operating 
and maintenance costs and under-invest in energy efficiency relative to the social 
optimum because they know that some homeowners are not able to see beyond the 
relatively high initial costs of energy-efficient appliances and building construction 
practices (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). Even though builders or landlords have enough 
knowledge and information about energy-efficient insulation or the necessary home 
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electronics, they may not adopt new and advanced technologies because the installation 
costs reflect in the price or the rent of the house and they know that tenants and home 
buyers are more interested in lower prices and rents than in the bill savings they might 
expect in the future.   
Time-dependent pricing systems also can solve the imperfect information problem 
by correcting price signals estimated based on information about the current marginal 
cost of electricity generation and transmission updated hourly or even more frequently. 
Since most of the electricity companies commonly use average-cost pricing systems 
under utility regulations, consumers are given retail prices that may not reflect marginal 
social costs. The average-cost prices normally depend on the average cost of the mix of 
generators used to produce electricity over a year or a season. When the average costs are 
below marginal cost, consumers face a price below the economically optimal price and 
are motivated to use electricity more than the optimal level. This market failure can be 
solved by market-based pricing systems that provide daily or hourly information. Pilot 
programs of alternative pricing schemes, such as time-of-use (TOU) pricing, peak and 
off-peak pricing (PTR), and critical-peak pricing (CPP), have proven that these time-
variant pricing systems have significant impacts on reduction in energy consumption and 
load shifting (Faruqui and Sergici, 2009).  
 
4.4 Policy Discussions from the Energy Consumer Sciences 
The various arguments from economics and other behavioral sciences can shed a 
light on policy designs for energy efficiency improvement and energy conservation. First, 
governments can educate consumers and encourage them to make their energy-use habits 
more efficient and can also adjust their sensitivity to changes in price and policy by 
providing various tips for saving energy. In addition, various incentive systems using 
price differentials might motivate households to respond more sensitively to price 
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changes. Rigorous consumption-recording and -monitoring systems, such as smart meters 
could promote the effectiveness of the incentive systems. Consumers could recognize 
how much energy they spend, and when they spend the most, based on the monitored 
energy-consumption record, and the information might help them to plan rationally for 
their own energy consumption. The number of installed smart meters has gradually 
grown, and 6.7 million smart meters were installed in 2008. However, 95 percent of 
residential buildings still remain unequipped (FERC, 2008). Ongoing R&D is expected to 
bring the cost down further, and a broad public advertisement would familiarize 
consumers with the monitoring system. When combined with enabling technology, 
energy conservation can be expedited (Brown et al., 2009).  
Second, governments can establish potentially high-impact behavioral research 
programs as part of their broader energy innovation programs. The behavioral programs 
support research on consumers’ rational or irrational behavioral attributes, such as their 
conceived discount rate for energy efficiency. The research could contribute to 
developing reasonable and effective incentive systems. Criteria for funding such 
behavioral research should be similar to those used for allocating resources to 
engineering and basic science research (Allcott and Mullaninathan, 2010). As they 
support technological R&D projects to develop theories and their applications, 
governments can provide funding for social sciences to scientifically measure and 
analyze consumers’ psychology and behavior in energy consumption and efficiency 
adoption through both theory-driven and empirical study. For instance, even though the 
results of recent real-time pricing (RTP) and critical-peak pricing (CPP) pilots 
demonstrate that consumers can and will adjust electricity usage in response to price 
changes, policy makers and pricing plan designers are still skeptical of the impact of 
large-scale implementation because there is no consensus on the degree to which 
consumers will respond to price changes. As a result, there is no concurrence on which 
pricing plan or plans should be adopted (Neenan and Eom, 2008). Rigorous theory-driven 
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social science research to measure the degree of the policy impact and to probe the 
mechanism of consumers’ behavior by income level or other demographic differences 
will be required in order to design a more effective pricing system. A bill under 
consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives, HR 3247, would establish a 
behavioral research program at the DOE to understand behavioral factors that affect 
energy conservation and accelerate the adoption of promising initiatives.  
Third, expanded informational programs can support consumers to save their 
energy. The educational programs can be utilized more successfully in the following 
ways. First of all, they can provide detailed and customized energy-saving tips to 
households and promote changes in energy-consuming habits more effectively. For 
example, the programs can give information on the differences between off-peak and 
high-peak prices and on how much money can be saved simply by rearranging the times 
that electricity is used. This could improve the short-run price elasticity of electricity 
demand. The improved responsiveness could contribute to conserving energy and 
redistributing the load so as not to overload the grid, generator, and transmission. In 
addition, the programs can ―nudge‖ consumers to make better choices in adopting 
energy-efficient products. Only through providing and educating about the kind of 
financial supports the government offers, such as tax credits, the U.S. could expect 
significant energy savings. These informational programs should be effectively designed 
with careful consideration given to behavioral factors in the disclosures they control 
because the effect of information on choices depends critically on how the information is 
conveyed (Allocott and Mullaninathan, 2010).  
Of course, the success of disclosure depends on the quality and consistency of 
information provided and the extent of public understanding. Information barriers occur 
when decision-makers do not have enough practical information to make investments in 
their own best interests. Consumers have been found not to be clearly aware of the 
relationships between their lifestyles, energy consumption, and the environment (Garrett 
 64 
and Koontz, 2008). Numerous facts and data are available to consumers, but they are 
regarded as useless information when information barriers are compounded by a lack of 
trusted and actionable guidelines. Information is often presented in terms that are not 
specific enough to drive consumer change (Gillingham, 2009). For that reason, more 
detailed and customized information is required to influence consumers efficiently. Even 
a simple feedback system accompanied by public information or education campaigns 
could have a great impact. For smart meters, there could be an online component to 
provide a customized electricity usage plan for each household based on their energy 
consumption and performance information. Consumers could be provided the specific 
rating scheme along with estimated benefits and costs of greater-efficiency units and 
retrofits. In addition, collecting feedback from various households could help to analyze 
more detailed behavioral characteristics of each household. A California case study 
demonstrated that, in most cases, consumer understanding of the meaning and usefulness 
of home energy performance data was a necessary prerequisite for interest in home 
energy performance (TecMarket Works, 2004).  
This chapter casts a light on that the wide understanding the energy consumer 
behavior and the empirical evidences provided by the various energy consumer sciences 




ENERGY POLICY AND RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY MARKET  
  
 Whether an energy policy is aimed to directly affect electricity price or not, it 
influences the market, utilities, and consumers and ultimately results in changes in price. 
This chapter reviews three major energy policies—energy efficiency, climate, and 
electricity pricing—that would have a potentially large impact on price changes. First, 
this chapter discusses carbon cap and trade and renewable electricity standard, and 
predicts how residential electricity price and consumption would under the scenario of a 
national carbon tax system and national renewable electricity standards. The price and 
consumption projections in this chapter are rough and preliminary estimations, but 
provide initial ideas for simulation experiments conducted in Chapter 6. Secondly, the 
effectiveness of two representative energy efficiency programs, ENERGY STAR and 
PATH, and their loopholes are discussed.  In the last section, time-dependent electricity 
pricing systems with economic theories of consumer behavior are discussed. 
 
5.1 Climate Policies  
National and international climate policies are anticipated to affect electricity 
consumption and prices in the future. This section reviews two major climate policies, the 
national carbon tax and the national Renewable Electricity Standard (RES), and predicts 
changes in future electricity consumption and prices. To assess the potential impacts of 
the two energy and climate policies currently being debated in the U.S. Congress, this 
study modifies the third version of AEO2009-NEMS with the Economic Stimulus 
Package. This study names it GT-NEMS in order to emphasize that energy projections 
from the GT-NEMS could be different from projections from the original NEMS. 
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National Carbon Cap and Trade System  
 Putting a price on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and creating a market for 
trading the carbon credits can be accomplished with various policies, including energy 
and carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems. Ten northeastern states—Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont—are participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), which is the first mandatory, market-based CO2 emissions reduction program in 
the United States (see the states marked in black in Figure 5.1). The signatory states to 
the RGGI agreement have capped CO2 emissions from the power sector and will require 
a 10-percent reduction in these emissions by 2018. Twelve western states have formed 
the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) to implement a joint strategy to reduce GHG 
emissions. The WCI cap and trade program aims to reduce GHG emissions by 15 percent 
below the 2005 level by 2020. The nine states in the Midwest signed their own GHG 
reduction accord. The Midwestern GHG Reduction Accord advisory group has finalized 
their recommendation. The governors are now reviewing the recommendations to offer 
their input on next steps to be taken in the region and at the federal level. The 
recommendations have not been endorsed or approved by individual governors. In the 
South, there is no regional program yet. This variety of divergent policies is particularly 
challenging to stakeholders who are striving to develop national markets. In recent years, 
the U.S. Congress has proposed hundreds of climate-related initiatives (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2009), and the pace of climate policy activity appears to be accelerating. 
Keeping step with the trend, an increasing number of U.S. companies has been 
participating in voluntary GHG emissions reduction programs and registries partly to 
prepare for eventual federal regulations (Southworth, 2009). Given the importance of 
placing a cost on carbon and the problems associated with the diversity of regional 
approaches that exists today, there is great momentum to establish a national policy of 
carbon constraints (Brown and Baek, 2011). The National Commission on Energy Policy 
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(NCEP, 2004) provides key design features of a cap-and-trade program pertaining to 
emission targets, point of regulation, price ceiling and floor, offsets, banking and 
borrowing, and allocation of allowances. It has been pointed out that having an 
effectively designed instrument is more important than the choice of policy (Aldy et al., 
2009; Goulder, 2009), since there have been some concerns about how the costs of the 
national policy would be distributed fairly across regions and income groups.  
 
Figure 5.1 Regional Carbon Cap-and-Trade Initiatives  
(Data Source: Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy, http://www.dsireusa.org/) 
 
Energy policy makers are aware of the importance of the policy and claim to be 
taxing polluters, not electricity consumers. Once the government creates a scarce new 
commodity, the costs would inevitably be passed on to the electricity prices. Peter 
Orszag, President Obama’s budget director, told Congress last year that ―Those price 
increases are essential to the success of a cap-and-trade program.‖ The Congressional 
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Budget Office (2007) estimates that the price hikes to reduce emissions by 15% would 
cost the average household in the bottom-income quintile about 3.3% of its after-tax 
income every year—the equivalent of $680, not including the costs of reduced 
employment and output. The three middle quintiles would see their paychecks cut 
between $880 and $1,500, or about 2.7 percent of their income. The rich would pay 1.7% 
(CBO, 2007). 
This study analyzes the potential impact of a national policy of carbon constraints 
on residential electricity and consumption by changing several parameters in GT-NEMS. 
First, based on examinations of the allowance price projections estimated by the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), and Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the annual 
schedule of carbon tax prices was estimated. This study models a carbon tax policy 
starting at $15 per ton of carbon dioxide (in 2005 dollars) in 2012, growing at 7% 
annually and reaching $51 per ton in 2030. In addition, an allowance redistribution 
system is implemented in GT-NEMS. It gives 90% of allowances to electricity-load-
serving entities and 10% to generators. The allowances given to the load-serving entities 
are assumed to be passed along to consumers and subdue the increase in retail electricity 
prices. 
A national carbon tax would raise the residential electricity price by 2% in 2020 and 
17% in 2030. The price inflation is forecast to be considerably higher than the price 
increase under a national electricity standard (see Figures 5.2). With the short-run 
elasticity of -0.15 in the model, there would be no significant change in consumption 
(Figure 5.3). With a higher short-run elasticity, a reduction in future demand is expected. 
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Figure 5.2 Residential Electricity Price Projections with a National Carbon Tax 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Residential Electricity Demand Projections with a National Carbon Tax  
 
Renewable Electricity Standard (RES) 
A renewable electricity standard (RES) is a legislative mandate requiring electricity 
suppliers in a given geographical area to employ renewable resources to generate a 
certain amount or percentage of renewable power by a target year (e.g., California will 























































































































suppliers can either produce their own renewable energy or buy renewable energy credits. 
Therefore, this policy blends the benefits of a ―command and control‖ regulatory 
paradigm with a free market approach to environmental protection. Renewable portfolio 
standards are currently mandated on a state-by-state basis. Currently, 36 states (including 
the District of Columbia) have some kind of RPS system in place, six of which set 
voluntary goals as opposed to strict requirements (Beck, 2009). Contrary to enabling a 
well-arranged national renewable energy market, however, inconsistencies between states 
over what counts as renewable energy, when it has to come online, how large it has to be, 
where it must be delivered, and how it may be traded clog the renewable energy market 
(Figure 5.4).  
 
 
Figure 5.4 State renewable electricity standards  
(Source: Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy, http://www.dsireusa.org/) 
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To reduce state-by-state inconsistencies and further accelerate the growth of 
renewable power production, the U.S. Congress is considering implementation of a 
national standard. Recent Congressional proposals tend to be consistent with President 
Obama’s campaign platform in 2008, which included a commitment to 25% renewable 
electricity production by 2025. Responding to requests from Chairman Edward Markey 
for an analysis of a 25% Federal RES, the EIA released the report ―Impacts of a 25-
Percent Renewable Electricity Standard as Proposed in the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act Discussion Draft‖ in 2009.  
This study examines the nominal target share for renewables requiring not only 
major utility companies but also small retailers to meet the aggressive national RES 
target in order to estimate the maximum impact of the aggressive national RES on 
industrial electricity and biomass markets. This study modeled an RES goal equivalent to 
the one pledged by President Obama in 2008. Specifically, the RES specifies that at least 
10 percent of U.S. electricity would come from renewable sources by 2012, and 25 
percent by 2025. It took into account the possible technological advancement in 
renewable energy technologies and updated the supply curves of the renewable energy 
sources.  
Figure 5.5 shows that a national RES would raise the prices by 2% in 2020 and 4% 
in 2030. This finding is replicated by other studies. The National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL, 2009) analyzed the potential impact of proposed national RES 
legislation by using the Regional Energy Development System (ReEDS) model and 
found that all of the RES bills, including Waxman-Markey, would have a modest impact 
on consumer electricity prices at the national level. Differences between average national 
electricity prices in the RES cases and the base case are less than 5%. 
 Like a national carbon tax, there was no significant change in consumption with the 
short-run elasticity of -0.15 in the GT-NEMS model (Figure 5.6). With a higher short-run 




Figure 5.5 Residential Electricity Price Projections with a National RES 
 
 


























































































































5.2 Energy Efficiency Programs for Residential Buildings 
 Financial incentives for purchasing energy-efficient appliances and equipment 
have been regarded as one of the most effective policies for expediting advanced 
technologies’ penetration of the market. Among these, tax credits could provide 
significant savings to households and builders, in that, while a tax deduction reduces just 
the amount of income subject to tax, a tax credit directly reduces the total amount of tax 
paid. Most of the residential tax credits, except for those applied to solar water heaters 
and panels, were expired as of December 31, 2007, but in the following year, the House 
passed 18.1 billion dollars in renewable energy tax incentives (HR 5351), including an 
extension of the tax credit for energy-efficient home improvements (Energy Star, 2008). 
In addition, the Department of Energy still calls for additional provisions of financial 
incentives to retailers selling large quantities of ―best-in-class‖ appliances per the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. 
Two representative efficiency programs in the residential buildings sector are 
Energy Star and the Partnership for Advancing Technology in Housing (PATH). Energy 
Star is a joint program of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) to help people save money and protect the environment 
through promoting energy-efficient products and practices. Consumers are estimated to 
have saved 16 billion dollars on their utility bills through the purchase of Energy Star 
equipment in 2007. Converted to carbon emissions, the savings are equivalent to those 
from 27 million cars (Energy Star, 2008). In particular, Energy Star labels appear to have 
achieved significant savings by inducing consumers to adopt greater energy efficiency 
(Webber et al., 2000). The voluntary Green Lights program and Energy Star office 
products program have been effective in increasing energy-efficiency investments by 
increasing access to information (Howarth et al., 2000). 
 74 
On the other hand, PATH was initiated to speed up the development and use of 
building technologies that improve the quality, durability, energy efficiency, 
environmental performance, and affordability of America’s housing. It is a voluntary 
partnership among leaders of homebuilding, material manufacturing, insurance and 
financial industries, and federal agencies related to housing. The PATH program 
incentivizes homebuilders with a 2,000-dollar tax credit for each energy-efficient house 
built.  
However, not all Energy Star qualified homes and products are eligible for a tax 
credit. These tax credits are available only for limited products at the highest efficiency 
levels, which cost more than standard products. In addition, builders must build houses 
whose heating and cooling load efficiency exceeds the level indicated by the Internal 
Energy Conservation Code (IECC) by 50 percent in order to qualify for the PATH tax 
credit. Foss (2007) points out that meeting the requirement is not an easy task: 
Code minimum requirements include a 13-seer air conditioner and 13-seer, 
7.7-HSPF heat pump. But the tax credit does not allow [homebuilders] to 
achieve the 50 percent heating and cooling reduction target through HVAC 
upgrade alone. [They] must improve the energy efficiency of the building 
envelope enough to reduce heating and cooling loads by at least 10 percent 
compared to 2004 IECC. In particular, builders should focus on air-sealing, 
window performance and insulation levels.  
Energy efficiency retrofits of older homes and improved home construction 
practices are considered the most cost-effective strategies for cutting energy costs and 
curbing carbon emissions (Granade et al., 2009). However, various market failures and 
barriers impede investments in these opportunities. The first of these is the diverse and 
fragmented nature of the buildings industry. Multiple participants influence the decision-
making process of a single house according to distinct interests, affecting the process at 
different points during design, construction, and use, and they often act as ―decision-
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making intermediaries‖ who do not represent the long-term interests of the building 
owners or occupants who pay the energy bills (Brown et al., 2009; Jaffe and Stavins, 
1994). The involvement of intermediaries in the purchase of energy technologies leads to 
an under-investment in energy efficiency. Even if there is no deviation in the process, 
homeowners themselves could weigh present and visible cash flows over uncertain flows 
in the future. Empirical evidence has been found in previous studies; the implicit discount 
rates range from 25% to over 100% (Sanstad et al., 2006; Train, 1985). 
Furthermore, outdated building codes and appliance standards could be barriers to 
energy-efficient buildings, in spite of their numerous positive influences. Since codes and 
standards take a long time to be implemented and updated, the best performing materials 
and technologies in the market are not readily deployed, thereby inhibiting innovation 
and encouraging obsolete technology (Brown et al., 2009). Even when states improve 
older building codes, the code compliance is often limited because many of them lack 
consistent code enforcement and support programs to improve the compliance rate (Yang, 
2005).  
In addition, there have been some controversies around the effectiveness of certain 
energy-efficiency policies. Some people argue that the policies for reducing carbon 
emissions and for saving energy might actually increase overall energy consumption—a 
side effect called the ―rebound‖ or ―takeback‖ effect, which might be caused either by 
unintended wastes or by energy consumers’ behavioral changes (Dinan 1989; Laitner 
2000). As the efficiency of heating equipment and housing structures improve, 
homeowners may choose to maintain higher indoor temperature levels because the price 
of heating becomes relatively less due to the improved efficiency. Through an empirical 
study on a retrofit homes program in Hood River, Oregon, Dinan (1989) found that 
retrofitted homes maintained an average 0.5 degree Fahrenheit increase in residential 
temperature level. She also found that the gap between the actual and expected levels of 
temperature by the retrofit program is wider among lower-income households (Dinan 
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1989). In addition, Laitner (2000) found that the rebound effect might reduce overall 
energy savings by about 2 to 3 percent, depending on the assumptions for income, price 
elasticities, and supply-demand interactions. 
Governments can improve the existing building codes and appliance standards so as 
to motivate electricity consumers to adopt energy-efficient technologies in the long run. 
Outdated building codes and appliance standards could be regulatory barriers to energy-
efficient residential buildings. Since codes and standards take a long time to be 
implemented and updated, the best performing materials and technologies in the market 
are not readily deployed, thereby inhibiting innovation and encouraging obsolete 
technology (Brown et al., 2009). Even when states improve older building codes, the 
code compliance is often limited because many of them lack consistent code enforcement 
and support programs to improve the compliance rate (Yang, 2005). In addition, 
principal-agent problems between builders and building owners could impede the 
adoption of active energy-efficiency measures. In order to overcome the latent problems 
in the existing policies, a consistent financial support for code enforcement and 
maintenance would be required. 
 
5.3 Time-dependent Electricity Rates and Smart Meters 
 Most households are given electricity prices that may not reflect marginal social 
costs since average-cost pricings under utility regulation are common. The retail prices 
typically reflect the average of these marginal costs over a period of months. The 
average-cost prices normally depend on the average cost of the mix of generators used to 
produce electricity. When the average costs are below the marginal cost, consumers face 
a price lower than the economically optimal price and are encouraged to use more 
electricity than the optimal level. On the other hand, market-based pricing provides daily 
or even hourly wholesale prices that reflect changes in market demand and operating 
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costs. For that reason, time-variant pricing systems, such as time-of-use (TOU) prices and 
real-time pricing (RTP), can shift demand from peak time to off-peak so as to stabilize 
the market. The TOU prices vary by time of day or season, whereas the RTP directly 
reflects information about the current marginal cost of generation and transmission and is 
updated hourly or even more frequently. RTP and, to a lesser degree, TOU pricing have 
the potential to alleviate the market failure caused by average-cost pricing (Gillingham et 
al., 2009). 
To make electricity demand responsive to price changes, rigorous recording and 
monitoring systems should precede incentive systems through price differentials. The 
term ―smart meter‖ refers to meters that record the consumption of electricity as well as 
natural gas and water hourly or more frequently and output the information through an in-
home device or on-line tool. The number of installed smart meters gradually grows and 
6.7 million smart meters were installed in 2008. However, 95 percent of residential 
buildings still remain unequipped (FERC, 2008). Ongoing R&D is expected to bring the 
cost down further and a broad public advertisement would make consumers familiar with 
the monitoring system. When combined with enabling technology such as smart meters, 
energy conservation can be accelerated (Brown et al., 2009).  
The potential for energy savings from time-dependent pricing is significant. 
Pfannenstiel and Faruqui (2008) found that the technical potential of the pricing system is 
25 percent, the economic potential 12 percent, and the market achievable potential 5 
percent during peak hours. Energy savings from smart meter technologies alone or in 
combination with alternative pricing have occurred both as load shifting and energy 
savings. Darby (2006) summarized that the energy savings caused by the direct feedback 
from meters in home displays ranged from 5 to 15 percent over several studies. Faruqui 
and Sergici (2009) argued that reducing the peak demand by five percent could lead to 
nationwide savings of $66 billion. The range of savings depends on uncertainties 
associated with combinations of different TOU rates and smart meters. Thus, research for 
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optimizing the design of smart meter and TOU pricing policies, including evaluation of 
pilot programs, is required. Faruqui and Sergici (2009) summarized the potential savings 
from the pilot programs (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Summary of savings from pilot time-dependent-pricing programs 
% of Savings Minimum Average Maximum 
Time of Use (TOU) Rate 2 4 6 
TOU with Technology 21 26 31 
Peak Time Rebates (PTR) 9 13 18 
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) 12 18 24 
CPP with Technology 17 36 51 
*Source: Faruqui and Sergici (2009) 
 
5.4 Ex Ante Evaluation of Policy Options 
Each of the policies discussed in this chapter have multiple policy options 
implementation. The impact of the policies discussed in this section could be evaluated 
differently depending on which criteria and assumptions are applied to the evaluation. 
Brown and her colleagues (2009) suggest eight criteria for evaluating energy policy 
options: 1) federal role, 2) applicability, 3) potential benefits, 4) non-R&D, 5) cost-
effectiveness, 6) administrative practicability, 7) additionality, and 8) time to savings. 
Table 5.2 shows the description of each standard. This study develops discussions of 
social welfare estimation according to the two of the potential benefits and the time to 
savings out of the eight criteria. 
 
Table 5.2 Criteria for Evaluating Policy Options (Brown et al., 2009) 
Criteria Description 
Federal Role Many of the more effective policies and measures in this area 
require state or local action. Must be clear regarding the 
appropriateness of the Federal role. 
Applicability Since the number of policies and measures to be analyzed is 
small, those selected for analysis should have broad applicability 
across the national scene. 
Potential benefits Policies and measures with significant and early quantitative 
benefits are to be favored over those with later and less. 
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Criteria Description 
Non-R&D The policies and measures selected should address barriers 
and/or risks of mainly an institutional, policy, or non-technical 
nature. 
Cost-effectiveness Consideration should be limited to those that would be expected 




Policies need to be capable of being fairly easily established and, 
if necessary, managed and/or enforced. 
Additionality The collection of selected policy options should be diverse, such 
that each option represents a somewhat different approach to a 
barrier or to different barriers. 
Time to Savings The shorter the time horizon required to achieve significant 
energy savings, the better. 
 
This study discuss ex ante evaluation of a carbon tax as an example in the 
following section. How differently the short-run consumer’s responsiveness affects the 




LONG-RUN DEMAND MODEL: 
NEMS EXPERIMENTS 
 
6.1 National Energy Modeling System 
 Using the value of the short-run price elasticity estimated in Chapter 3, this 
chapter examines the sensitivity of the long-run U.S. residential electricity demand to 
various short-run elasticity settings. To forecast consumers’ responsiveness in the long-
run, this study uses the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS), a computer-based, 
energy-economy modeling system of U.S. energy markets developed by the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). It predicts the supplies, demands, and prices of 
various energy resources subject to macroeconomic factors, world energy market 
indicators, resource availability, technological advancement, and regional characteristics. 
It is typically used by the EIA as well as other parties in order to forecast the energy, 
economic, environmental, and security impacts on U.S. alternative energy policies and to 
conduct sensitivity analyses. The modeling system includes regional details based on the 
nine U.S. census divisions and is able to project regional variations in energy costs, 
policies, and resource availabilities. NEMS consists of four supply modules, four demand 
modules, two conversion modules, two exogenous modules, and one integrating module 
(see Figure 6.1). Each module of NEMS assumes various cases of economic growth in 
the U.S. and in the world energy market, particularly world oil prices. To embody the 
assumptions, it represents a scenario for each of the following cases: a reference case, 
high and low economic growth cases, and high and low world oil price cases. The 




Figure 6.1 National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) 
(Source: National Energy Modeling System: An Overview of 2003, EIA 2003) 
 
Among the 13 different modules, this study focuses especially on the Residential 
Demand Module (RDM). The RDM is built based on the EIA’s Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey (RECS) collected in 2005. The RDM projects annual residential-
sector energy demand, appliance stocks, and market shares of the entire U.S. by nine 
census divisions, fuel type, and service based on accounting principles and residential 
consumer behaviors (EIA, 2007). In other words, the RDM provides national residential 
energy demands at the macro level. For that reason, it is regarded as the housing and 
equipment stock model. The residential energy demand of the entire U.S. is influenced by 
residential housing stock and energy consuming equipment, especially by building shell 
efficiency (EIA 2003): ―… in the residential building model, price-induced increase in 
building shell efficiency such as insulation, caulking, and thermally-efficient windows 
persist longer than other equipment purchase decisions because adjustments to the shell 
are assumed to retire only when the housing unit decays from the stock‖ (Wade, 2003). 
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 The RDM generates projections of residential energy demand through six 
sequential steps; these steps produce information on housing stocks, technology choices, 
appliance stocks, building shell integrity, distributed power generation, and energy 
consumption. First, the RDM generates a projection of housing stock, accounting for the 
retirement of existing housing stock and the addition of new construction. Second, the 
module estimates vintage equipment stock based on the number of housing demolitions 
and additions. Third, the market shares of equipment by service are estimated. Fourth, the 
weighted average efficiencies are calculated based on market shares. Finally, the RDM 
calculates energy consumption by fuel using the unit energy consumption data and the 
weighted efficiencies (EIA, 2007).  
 
Figure 6.2 Structure of the Residential Demand Module (RDM) 
(Source: Model Documentation Report: RDM of the NEMS, EIA 2007) 
 
The RDM applies various research findings from academic, industrial, and 
government studies to the model, beginning with implementing the short-run price 
Forecast Housing Stock 
Forecast Appliance Stock 
Choose Technology 
Choose Building Shell 
Choose Distributed Generation Equipment 
Compute Consumption 
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elasticity of demand by end-use service. EIA has applied the rebound effect
13
 to the 
RDM, because many empirical studies have revealed the effect of efficiency policies on 
energy consumption. The module assumes a 0.15 percent increase in consumption for a 1 
percent increase in efficiency. Furthermore, a discrete building shell module has been 
added in order to characterize several efficiency programs sponsored by the DOE and 
EPA, such as Energy Star and PATH. The choice of Energy Star and PATH homes is 
modeled on the basis of tradeoffs between increased construction costs and reduced 
energy costs. (EIA, 2003; Wade, 2003; EIA, 2007). 
With the growing appreciation of how energy consumption impacts environmental 
quality and national security, future consumer behavior could further enlarge the savings 
estimate as the demand for energy-efficient technologies grows. The inclusion of 
additional behavioral effects would provide a more precise estimate of efficiency 
potential.  
 
6.2 Distributed Short-run Elasticity Calculation Function  
 The source codes of the RDM are thoroughly reviewed to figure out how the 
short-run price elasticity parameter (alpha) is utilized in NEMS long-run demand 
forecast. The actual Fotran codes are shown in Appendix F. First of all the RDM define 
three distributional shares for the short-run elasticity effects of EF1, EF2, and EF3. They 
are used as lag weights that redistribute the impact of alpha into three consecutive years. 
Therefore, the sum of the three should be equal to 1. Then, the RDM defines a distributed 
short-run elasticity function, RSELAST as a function of EF1, EF2, and EF3, and alpha.  
 




 The rebound effect in energy consumption is discussed in the section of behavioral failure in Chapter 4 
and in the section of the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs for residential buildings in Chapter 5. 
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 To link EF1, EF2, and EF3 to RSELAST, the RDM defines three intermediate 
parameters of FAC1, FAC2, and FAC3 which are computed like as follows: 
 
If current year  RECS year+1, 
      
                        
                    
 
           
 
If current year  RECS year+2, 
      
                          
                    
 
           
 
If current year  RECS year+3, 
      
                          
                    
 
           
 
[Equation 6.1] 
Then, RSELAST is ultimately defined as:  
 
RSELAST =  FAC1*FAC2*FAC3       
                                             [Equation 6.2] 
 
The RSELAST is used to adjust the computed annual energy consumption by fuel and 
end use from the sequential calculations listed in Figure 6.2. 
 On balance, the internal source codes indicate that the NEMS applies a lagged 
structure of demand and distribute of the impact of short-run consumer’s responsiveness 
into multiple years. This means that when price shocks occurs, consumer gradually adjust 





6.3 Technology Choice 
 The production function theory in economics can explains how market forces and 
technological innovation affect consumers’ choice of energy efficiency. This framework 
views capital and energy as two inputs for producing energy services. Along an isoquant 
curve depicting a given level of indifferent energy services, the cost-minimizing level of 
energy efficiency (capital) and energy use are found at the point of tangency where the 
marginal increase in capital cost with respect to energy reduction is equal to their relative 
price (in present-value terms) (Figure 6.3). The relative price depends on the capital cost 
of efficiency improvements, the discount rate, expected energy prices, equipment 
utilization, and decision-time horizon. This framework is applicable not only to the 
household but also to the broad sectoral or national level where energy and capital are 
used to produce energy services. 
 Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show two different ways for market forces to drive 
greater energy efficiency within this production function framework. First, households 
could move along the energy services isoquant by substituting capital for energy input in 
response to a change in relative price. Figure 6.3 describes a situation when the relative 
price between capital and energy changes from P0 to P1. Second, technological change 
(innovation) that shifts the isoquant in a way favoring greater energy efficiency could 
change the production possibilities available to households. Figure 6.4 describes a 
situation that technological innovation shifts the isoquant curve itself and make it 
possible for consumers to produce the same level of energy services with a smaller level 
of energy input. In contrast, energy conservation not driven by energy efficiency 
improvement would be associated with a lower level of energy-service production. 
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Figure 6.3 Substitution between Energy Use and Capital Investment  
(Source: Gillingham et al., 2009)  
 
Figure 6.4 Technological innovation  
(Source: Gillingham, 2009)  
 
Gillingham et al. (2009) argue that market failures can be explained within this 
framework as a divergence of the relative prices used for private decisions from the 
economically efficient prices. Both unpriced environmental externalities and missing 
information about the energy intensity of product use result in a lower relative price of 
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energy. The underestimated price of energy leads to choices of inefficiently low energy 
efficiency (e.g. P0 compared with P1 in figure 6.4). 
 In the RDM in NEMS, consumers are allowed to choose their technology level 
among the various levels of cost and efficiency for a given class of equipment. Electric 
heat pump is an example of an equipment class for heating. Equipment type refers to 
different efficiency ratings in a class of equipment (e.g., high- vs. low-efficiency electric 
heat pumps). The RDM employs a time-dependent function for computing the installed 
capital cost of equipment in new construction and the retail replacement cost of 
equipment in existing housing. Energy efficiency (technology) choices fundamentally 
involve investment decisions with consideration of trade-offs between higher initial 
capital costs in the present and uncertain lower operating costs in the future. The decision 
of whether to invest in energy-efficient equipment requires comparing the initial capital 
cost to the expected cumulative future savings. From an economic perspective, rational 
consumers assess the future savings considering future energy prices, operating costs 
expected from the efficient equipment, intensity of the use of the product, and equipment 
lifetime. They compare these expected future cash flows against the initial cost, 
discounting the future cash flows to present values. A privately optimal decision entails 
choosing the level of energy efficiency to minimize the present value of private costs, 
whereas economic efficiency at a societal level would require minimizing social costs 
(Gillingham et al., 2009).   
 Energy market prices influence consumer decisions regarding how much energy 
to consume and whether to invest in energy-efficient equipment.  A persistent energy 
price increase affects energy efficiency adoption. Many previous studies analyzed which 
factors influence technology adoption and found that higher energy prices are associated 
with significantly greater adoption of energy-efficient equipment (Anderson and Newell, 
2004; Hassett and Metcalf, 1995; Jaffe et al., 1995). The concept of ―price induced 
technology change‖ is included in the formulation of capital costs of the RDM in NEMS 
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to reflect this effect. This concept allows future technologies to be diffused into the 
marketplace faster if fuel prices increase markedly and remain high over a multiple-year 
period. The Technology Choice Submodule (TCS) uses a log-linear function to adjust 
technology market shares. The module adjusts the current market shares based on 
consumer behavior as a function of capital costs, operating costs, and efficiency.  
 First, the TCS compares the average fuel price for a given fuel (electricity, in this 
study) over a three-year period to the price observed in the base year: 
 
              
                                  
           
       [Equation 6.3] 
Where,   
              
                                                                          
(y = current year, f = fuel type) 
 
Shifts from 0 to 10 years are allowed in the current model formulations. Technological 
shifts in a relatively short term are limited by the algorithm in order to ensure that over-
shifting does not occur. In other words, future technologies cannot become available 
before a persistent price change is projected to occur for at least three years. The 
formulation allows technologies potentially to shift toward earlier availability, and once 
shifted, they never shift back. This shift is represented as: 
            
                  
    
            [Equation 6.4] 
 
subject to the constraints listed in Appendix C. Operational and capital costs of 
technology data presented in equations [Equation C.1] and  [Equation C.2] in the 
appendix are adjusted according to the results obtained in equation [Equation 6.3].  
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For instance, when y = 2007and f = electricity, 
If  PRICEDELTA2007,electricity = 1, there is no technological shift 
If  PRICEDELTA2007,electricity = 2, the most advanced technologies in 10 
years from 2007 come forward to the current year. 
 
The TCS assumes that if a ―persistent‖ doubling of electricity prices exists, the most 
advanced equipment available in 10 years from today will be selected.  
The TCS module also includes the option to use life-cycle costing to adjust market shares. 
The life cycle cost calculation is: 
                                          
                   
     





               is the life cycle cost of an equipment type by forecast year, housing type, 
and Census Division, and vintage;           is the installed capital cost of an 
equipment type based on EQCOST with RTEQCOST1es;         is the number of 
years into the future used to compute the present value of future operating cost 
expenditures, presently set to seven years; and DISRT is the discount rate applied to 
compute the present value of future operating costs, presently at 20 percent. 
 
6.4 Long-run Demand Forecast 
 The original NEMS employs price elasticities of demand that result in limited 
demand sensitivity for some technologies. It employs a price elasticity of 0 for clothes 
washers, dishwashers, stoves, refrigerators, and freezers. The price elasticities of the 
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remaining residential technologies, such as TVs and computers, are set at -0.15. This set 
of modeling assumptions may accurately reflect past consumer behavior from the 1970s 
to 1990s, but it might not accurately reflect consumer behavior in the present or future 
when electricity prices should continue to rise in real terms (Brown et al., 2010). To 
figure out today’s consumer behavior, this study estimated the short-run price elasticity 
of residential electricity demand with the EIA’s RECS survey data collected in 2005. The 
econometric analysis found that the short-run price elasticity of residential electricity 
demand is -0.66.  
Of course, it would be somewhat hasty to argue and conclude that today’s 
consumers are almost 5 times more responsive to price changes than past consumers. 
Since the variables for short-run price elasticities of the original NEMS are set based on 
the meta-analysis conducted by Dahl in the 1990s, differences in methodology and data 
could explain part of the gap. The meta-analysis incorporates research results from 
previous studies conducted from the late 1970s to early 1990s, which applied a variety of 
methods to estimate elasticity values. On the other hand, the estimated short-run elasticity 
in this study is derived from the 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey and 
employs a specific log linear function and the OLS estimation technique. However, even 
if some portion of the difference in the short-run elasticity values is attributed to 
differences in method and data, it seems that today’s consumers react to changes in price 
and policy more sensitively than those in the past. Public appeals and education through 
mass media might have led consumers to change their behaviors in energy consumption. 
This section analyzes how changes in short-run behavioral characteristics affect 
changes in long-run electricity demand.  
 
Experiments with GT-NEMS and long-run price elasticity calculation 
 The distinction between the short-run and long-run elasticities is critical in 
understanding energy markets. Responsiveness of energy demand to price change could 
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vary depending on the time span of the analysis. In economics theory, the short run is 
defined as a period of time in which the quantity of at least one input is fixed and the 
quantities of the other inputs can be varied. The long run is a period of time in which the 
quantities of all inputs can be varied. Thus, there is no fixed period of time to separate the 
short run from the long run. By responding to a price movement, the short-run elasticity 
measures immediate consumer response, such as changing energy-consuming habits, and 
the long-run elasticity measures total response, including technology shifts such as 
appliance changes.  
To assess the potential impacts of future electricity price increases on demand, this 
study employs the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). The study named the 
modified model GT-NEMS in order to emphasize that energy projections from this model 
could be different from projections derived from the original NEMS. 
EIA and other research parties have conducted various experiments with the 
original NEMS simulation. Hadley and his colleagues analyzed the contribution of five 
potential building technologies (solid-state lighting, advanced geothermal, integrated 
energy equipment, efficient operations technologies, and smart roofs) to estimate energy 
savings and building efficiency improvement (Hadley, MacDonald, et al. 2004). Wade 
(2003) conducted several experiments on price responsiveness with the residential and 
commercial buildings sector models in the AEO2003-NEMS. He derived own-price and 
cross-price elasticities with both short-run and long-run models. He doubled the current 
price level and entered the artificially created price as a price shock in the simulation 
model and then observed how the electricity and natural gas demand finally reached a 
new point of equilibrium. He manipulated two different situations: temporary and 
permanent shock situations. He also created a sudden shock lasting one year and a 
permanent price inflation lasting multiple years and then examined the differences in 
their price adjustment behaviors. With the initial demand level and the new equilibrium 
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level, he calculated the price elasticities of electricity and natural gas demand, 
respectively. 
Following the methodology used by Wade (2003), this study conducts a quasi-
experimental analysis to estimate the long-run price elasticity of energy demand in the 
residential sector with the NEMS developed for publishing the Annual Energy Outlook 
2009 (AEO2009). The default values of the short-run price elasticities of heating and 
cooling (alpha = -0.15) are replaced with the new elasticity value (-0.66) estimated by 
this study. The elasticity values derived from the econometric analysis with the 2005 
RECS survey are plugged into the NEMS model, and then the difference in output 
between the two is observed. The advantage of using the elasticity value derived directly 
from the RECS survey is that the Residential Demand Module (RDM) of the NEMS is 
modeled using the same survey data to estimate technology choices and annual appliance 
stocks. To estimate responses to energy price changes, a series of alternative simulations 
is made based on adjustments to the energy price paths from the AEO 2009. The 
adjustments model permanent price inflations by 10%, 30%, and 50% beginning in 2010 
and continuing through the end of the model run, 2030 (Figure 6.5).  
 















































































Figure 6.6 shows that the initial reduction in consumption rapidly widens the gap 
between a reference and modified scenarios by 2013. It is because the internal source 
codes of NEMS applies a lagged structure of demand and distribute of the impact of 
short-run consumer’s responsiveness, but it just considers only the three years from the 
year when the shock occurs. Then, the consumption projections are stabilized until 2030. 
As predicted, scenarios having the more elastic short-run demand function (alpha = -0.66) 
respond to price inflations more sensitively than those with default elasticity values 
(alpha = -0.15) of the original NEMS. According to the consumption projections under 
the various price inflation and price elasticity scenarios, the scenario with a 30% price 
increase and alpha = -0.66 shows a greater consumption reduction than that with a 50% 
price increase and alpha = -0.15. This consequence means that pricing programs designed 
to achieve a specific level of consumption reduction during specified periods could be 
achieved at around half of the price increase under the scenario of more elastic demand. 
Also, the result suggests that benefits from price policies could be calculated differently 
under different elasticity assumptions. When consumers become more elastic to price 
changes, price policies can be more effectively implemented, giving consumers more 
benefits. The potential reductions are forecasted based on the assumption that all 




Figure 6.6 Electricity Consumption Projections in the Residential Sector 
 
In addition, the long-run price elasticities of the original NEMS and modified 
NEMS (GT-NEMS) are calculated based on the outputs of the NEMS experiments. As 
McClung (1988) points out that elasticity values from micro data are estimated to be 
smaller than those derived from macro data, this study similarly finds that long-run 
demand functions are more elastic than short-run demand functions. The long-run 
elasticity of electricity demand in the residential sector is found to be -2.44 ~ -2.99 under 
the scenario with alpha = -0.66 (Table 6.1). Because electricity competes with natural gas 
as fuel for heating, when electricity price goes up, the natural gas demand increases 





















Reference (alpha = -0.15) Elastic Demand (alpha = -0.66)
10% price increase (alpha = -0.15) 10% price increase (alpha = -0.66)
30% price increase  (alpha = -0.15) 30% price increase  (alpha = -0.66)
50% price increase (alpha = -0.15) 50% price increase (alpha = -0.66)
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gas, this study estimated cross-price elasticities: 0.15 ~ 0.28 (with alpha = - 0.15) and 
0.15 ~ 0.34 (with alpha = -0.66). 
 
Table 6.1 Long-run Price Elasticities* 
 
 Original NEMS  
(with SR-elasticity of -0.15) 
GT-NEMS 
(with more elastic SR-
elasticity of -0.66) 
Own-Price Elasticities -1.67 ~ -0.81 -2.44 ~ -2.99 
Cross-Price 
Elasticities** 0.15 ~ 0.28 0.15 ~ 0.34 
* Elasticities are measured using the logarithmic percentage change formula give by: elasticity = 
ln(q1/q0)/ln(p1/p0), where p0 and q0 are base prices and quantities and p1 and q1 represent an alternate price-
quantity combination. 
**Cross-price elasticities show changes in demand of competing goods (in this case, natural gas 
consumption) when the electricity prices change. 
   
 




















Reference (alpha = -0.15) Elastic Demand (alpha = -0.66)
10% price increase (alpha = -0.15) 10% price increase (alpha = -0.66)
30% price increase  (alpha = -0.15) 30% price increase  (alpha = -0.66)
50% price increase (alpha = -0.15) 50% price increase (alpha = -0.66)
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Comparison with Other Studies 
 The absolute values of long-run price elasticities derived from the GT-NEMS are 
greater than those of the previous studies summarized in Table 6.2. Wade (2003) 
estimated the long-run price elasticities with the AEO2003 and AEO99 and found that 
the own-price elasticity was -0.49 with the AEO2003 and -0.31 with the AEO99. The 
cross-price elasticity estimated from AEO2003 was 0.13, and that from AEO99 was 0.08. 
Both of AEO2003 and AEO2009 assumed short-run elasticities at -0.15 for their energy 
consumption projections. This analysis finds that households respond to price changes 
more sensitively compared to those in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
 
Table 6.2 Elasticities from other studies 
Author Data Type Model Type Long Run Elasticity 
Price Income 
Halvorsen (1975) State level 
Aggregate Data 
Static -1.15 0.51 
Houthakker et al. 
(1980) 
-1.18 1.39 
Houthakker (1980) Dynamic -1.42 1.78 
McClung (1988) Micro Data 
(RECS) 
Static -0.42 0.15 
 
 
Impacts of SR-elasticity assumption on Electricity Market Forecast 
 This section provides an empirical analysis showing how price and consumption 
would change under different assumptions of price elasticity of demand. A set of NEMS 
experiments are conducted to show how the difference in short-run price elasticity 
influences the electricity prices and consumption levels in the future. A Carbon Cap and 
Trade system is commonly expected to increase electricity prices. The electricity price 
increase is observed in a preliminary NEMS forecast shown in Chapter 5. Figure 6.8 
indicates that the magnitude of the price escalation would be estimated larger with an 
assumption of less elastic short-run demand (alpha = -0.15), at the same time, the 
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magnitude of reduction in electricity use would be smaller. While a model with alpha = -
0.15 forecasted that the policy would increase the residential electricity price by 17% in 
2030, another model with alpha = -0.66 predicts that the price would go up by only 12% 
in the same year. The consumption is anticipated to shrink by 4% with alpha = -0.15, 
whereas the consumption is forecasted to decrease by 9% with alpha = -0.66. If 
consumers are assumed to be more sensitive to price changes, the change in consumption 
caused by a policy would be estimated relatively larger. Thus, the price escalation would 
be estimated relatively smaller. The initial market equilibrium points are altered as a 
result of the higher elasticity of demand.  
 
  
Figure 6.8 Price and Consumption Projections under the Carbon Tax Scenario 
(Residential Electricity) 
  
 The impact of the RPS policy on price and consumption is anticipated be smaller 
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Carbon Tax (alpha = -0.66)
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CHAPTER 7 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Policy Implications 
Impacts of SR-elasticity assumption on Electricity Market Forecast 
 Based on the price and demand changes, it estimates how much social welfare 
gain the U.S. might expect if households are more responsive to changes in price and 
policy. Consumer surplus is defined as the amount by which consumers’ willingness to 
pay for a commodity exceeds the sum they actually have to pay. Changes in social 
welfare expected from more elastic demand could be estimated with the concept of 
consumer surplus. Shown in Figure 7.1, consumer surplus is measured by the area under 
the demand curve and above a horizontal line at the market price. Thus, when price is P0, 
consumer surplus is triangle abc (Figure 7.1). When the price of electricity increases to 
P1 because of an energy policy such as carbon tax, consumer surplus is the area under the 
demand curve and above a horizontal price line at the increasing price, but because the 
price is now P1, the relevant area is triangle ade. Consumer surplus has decreased by the 
difference between areas ecg and ebd (i.e., area dbce). Policy-makers can estimate the 
shape of the demand curve, and the policy’s benefits can be measured.  
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Figure 7.1 Measuring the Change in Consumer Surplus 
 
The welfare gain or loss from price changes varies with the absolute value of the 
slope of the demand curve. In the case of a price increase, the less steep the demand 
curve (i.e., the more price-responsive the demand), the less steep the demand curve (i.e., 
the more price-responsive the demand), the less is the welfare loss. When the price of a 
commodity increases due to a tax policy, consumers who are more sensitive to price 
changes will substitute the good with another or will reduce the consumption level so as 
to escape the tax burden. If consumers are assumed to be more elastic to the price 
changes than the BAU case, the magnitude of social welfare changes will be estimated 
greater.  
Economists argue that a flexible demand will help balance fluctuations in supply, 
improve market efficiency, reduce price volatility, and create a welfare gain. Suppose 
that the original demand curve is      (Figure 7.2). With a price increase from P0 to P1, 
the amount of loss in consumer surplus is area fghi. On the other hand, with a more 
elastic demand curve,       , the social welfare loss is area fkhi. The gap between the two 
areas (= area kgh) is the welfare gain we can expect from the more elastic demand curve. 
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Figure 7.2 Social Welfare Change among Different Elasticities 
 
Suppose that the residential electricity price increases by 10% (compared to a BAU 
scenario) in 2030 because of an energy policy, such as a new carbon tax. The market 
equilibrium (price, quantity) under the BAU scenario of AEO 2009 with no carbon tax 
policy is $34.5 per million Btu and 5.7 quadrillion Btu. When the price increases by 10% 
from $34.5 to $38.0 per million Btu, the optimal quantity will decrease from 5.7 to 4.8 
quadrillion Btu. The social welfare loss caused by the price increase will be $18.4 billion 
(equivalent to area fghi). 
If the demand is more elastic (alpha = -0.66) than the reference case (alpha = -0.15), 
the social welfare loss will be smaller than the reference case. The loss would be $ 17.5 
billion (equivalent to area fkhi). Thus, the difference in welfare estimate is $900 million 
(=$18.4 billion - $17.5 billion) a year (Figure 7.3). 
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Figure 7.3 Social Welfare Calculations with Actual Numbers from AEO2009 
 
This study calculated changes in quantity of residential electricity demand, welfare 
losses due to electricity price increases. Table 7.1 shows that the assumption of more 
elastic demand (alpha= -0.66) leads to a greater reduction in electricity consumption and 
a smaller welfare loss than that of less elastic demand (alpha=-0.15). The greater the price 
inflation, the larger the difference in social welfare estimate. When the retail electricity 
price increases by 10% the difference in social welfare estimation is $ 0.9 billion. With a 
50% increase in price, the gap reaches $9.6 billion. In addition to the impact on consumer 
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Overall Policy Implications  
Policy is basically designed and intended to motivate members of a society to change 
their behavior and achieve a goal collectively. Thus, setting assumptions about human 
behavior need to be treated most carefully in policy modeling. This study probed the 
responsiveness of residential electricity demand to price changes from various angles. 
Behavioral characteristics responding to the electricity market are affected by various 
factors such as income, housing, climate, appliance holdings, and even psychological 
factors. A series of the analyses presented in this study suggests important policy 
implications to energy policy makers.  
First, federal and state governments need to periodically understand how consumers 
respond to price signals when they determine their electricity consumption levels. 
Governments might benefit from supporting academic studies on price elasticities. The 
comprehensive understanding of the price elasticities can assist policy analysts and 
makers to forecast future electricity demand, which can be used to set policy goals for 
energy conservation programs and demand control programs. Employing a conventional 
econometric approach, this study estimated the price elasticity of residential electricity 
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demand with 2005 RECS data, which is collected by the DOE and is open to the public. 
Employing a conventional econometric model and a discrete/continuous choice model, 
this exercise revealed that the price elasticity derived from the current cross-sectional 
gives a range of the price elasticity of demand of - 0.81 ~ - 0.66, which indicates pretty 
elastic demand
14
. The model used in this study also showed that income, climate, number 
of rooms, price of competing goods, and appliance holdings significantly affect the price 
elasticity of demand. The estimate could vary depending on the estimation methods and 
techniques. Periodical meta-analyses supported by government agencies would provide 
very useful information for those creating government policies and for those conducting 
academic studies as well. This study introduced two representative meta-analyses 
conducted in the 1990s and 2000s. The meta analyses of the elasticity estimates provide 
guidelines for determining what the important variables are for estimating elasticity and 
how the estimates might be adjusted when they are derived with unfavorable data. For 
scientific policy analyses, the application of the elasticity to policy evaluation is as 
important as the accurate estimation of elasticity. 
Second, the price elasticity should be seriously considered in the ex ante evaluation 
of electricity demand control programs and other energy policies. In particular, the price 
elasticity of demand is considered as an important factor in the ex ante evaluation of 
alternatives of the time of use rate and smart meters. Demand forecasting is crucial to the 
ex ante evaluation of energy conservation programs. The ex ante evaluation of a policy is 
generally a necessary process in policy design prior to its implementation. In this process, 
policy analysts review all the alternatives that stakeholders and policy makers reasonably 
care about. Projecting the outcome of each alternative often requires forecasting not only 
the directional change but also the magnitude. Predicting a directional change for a policy 




 This statement is justified by the current meta-analysis of price elasticities of residential electricity 
demand conducted by Espey and Espey (2004). 
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is relatively simple. However, forecasting the magnitude is regarded as the most difficult 
step in policy analysis (Bardach, 2000). The Energy Information Administration (EIA) of 
the DOE releases the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) to provide energy market forecasts 
under the energy policies effective every year. The National Energy Modeling System 
(NEMS) has been developed by the EIA to make it possible to estimate the impact of a 
policy on energy supply, demand, and price. Many policy studies have been conducted 
with NEMS, and their quantitatively presented outcomes actually have been used in 
Congress. The forecasts depend on thousands of input variables used in the modeling 
system, such as technological characteristics and macroeconomic indicators. The 
previous section showed how different settings on the short-run elasticity affect not only 
the demand forecasts but also social welfare estimates. Under a Carbon Tax scenario that 
raises the electricity price by 10%, the social welfare loss is estimated at $17.5 billion 
under an elastic demand function (alpha = -0.66) and at $18.4 billion under a reference 
(alpha = -0.15). In addition, a further 9% reduction in consumption could be expected 
under the elastic demand. The goals of the energy efficiency policy and climate change 
policy are to conserve energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The goal of a carbon 
tax or cap and trade is generally set as a percentage below 1990 levels in certain years. 
Brown and her colleagues (2009) suggested eight criteria for evaluating energy policy 
options such as 1) potential benefits, 2) cost-effectiveness, 3) time to savings, 4) 
applicability, 5) additionality, 6) administrative practicability, 7) non-R&D, and 8) 
federal role. The common measures for judgment of the effectiveness of a policy are 
benefit-to-cost ratios, social welfare estimates, and the absolute amount of reduction of 
target pollutants and energy savings. The previous section showed how the policy 
outcomes could be predicted differently depending on the assumption of human behavior. 
If people are assumed to be more elastic to price signals, the time it takes for a policy to 
accomplish its goal could be shorter. 
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The variation among elasticity estimates is not a problem when policy makers and 
researchers apply them to policy designs and analyses, if they correctly understand what 
causes the variation and how the variation affects price and demand forecasts as well. 
This study discussed how the different assumptions of price elasticity influence the 
projections of price and consumption and the estimates of social welfare change. When 
policy makers and governors design energy efficiency policies aimed at saving energy, 
they can use relatively high elasticity values for their ex ante evaluation if they assume 
that more informational programs would be implemented to educate consumers to be 
sensitive to price signals and tips for improving energy efficiency levels.  
Given the variety of energy sources used to generate electricity, the continuous 
expansion of urban areas in the United States, and the uncertainty of national and 
international energy markets, understanding consumers’ responsiveness to electricity 
price changes is necessary for municipalities, utility companies, and policy makers to 
predict future energy needs and design pricing and taxation policies (Espey and Espey, 
2004). In addition to designing monetary incentives relevant to electricity prices, 
decisions about new sources of electric power, the construction of new power plants, or 
the creation of new interstate transmission lines also requires an accurate understanding 
of the price elasticity of demand. Even though the importance of understanding price 
elasticities in policy design and analysis is widely recognized among policy analysts, it is 
still true that there are confusions and often contradictory results of residential elasticity 
estimates. At present, utilities and utility commissions tend to use an approximate value 
of short-run elasticity in the range of -0.4 to -0.2; the EIA uses -0.15 for analyzing the 
residential electricity market; this study estimated it at -0.66; the median value of Espey 
and Espey (2004)’s study is -0.35. 
On balance, this study shows that how the residential electricity market would be 
affected by policies depends highly on the price elasticity of demand. The relationships 
among price, consumption, and policy are interconnected, and the price elasticity of 
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demand is an important factor characterizing the relationship. As noted in the previous 
section about social welfare impact, the duration of a policy can be adjusted depending 
on the price elasticity assumption. 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
 In order to understand consumers’ behavioral responsiveness to changes in price 
and policy at both the micro and macro levels over the short and long runs, this study 
employed a hybrid method of conventional econometric analyses and energy market 
simulations with the National Energy Modeling system (NEMS). The econometric 
analysis with individual household survey data contributed to setting new assumptions on 
short-run demand functions of residential households in the NEMS. Prior to the NEMS 
experiments with the adjustments of short-run price elasticities and the price shocks, this 
study examined how energy policies would have a potentially large impact on electricity 
prices in the future. When climate policies are implemented nationally, electricity prices 
are estimated to increase in 2030 by 17% with a carbon cap and trade initiatives and 4% 
with Renewable Electricity Standards. Once the federal government creates a scarce new 
commodity such as cleanliness of air, some portion of the costs for generating clean 
electricity would unavoidably be passed on to retail electricity prices. The increased 
prices could be considered as positive signals for conserving energy and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Those price increases may be essential to the success of a cap-
and-trade program. However, the price signals could be used effectively only when the 
public responds to the signals sensitively. If electricity demand is inelastic to changes in 
price and policy, it would be inevitable that some portion of the tax burden be passed on 
to consumers. 
 Employing the conventional econometric model and the discrete/continuous 
choice model, this study estimated the price elasticity of residential electricity demand 
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with the most recent Residential Energy Consumption Survey data collected in 2005. The 
short-run elasticity of demand was found to be in the range of - 0.81 ~ - 0.66, which is 
greater than the current NEMS assumption of -0.15 in absolute value. The 2005 RECS 
data detailed information about American households’ energy consumption. This rich 
source of micro-level data complements the existing econometric analysis based on time 
series data. Time series studies lack information concerning appliance stock, building 
characteristics, differences in climates, and demographic characteristics and are usually 
aggregates over the entire nation’s or region’s data. The use of this cross-sectional data, 
however, allows researchers to consider the interventions across the households; thus, the 
cross-sectional data was used for this analysis. The value of - 0.81 was estimated by the 
discrete/continuous choice model and interpreted as a long-run price elasticity of demand. 
The difference in short-run price elasticity would lead to a difference in social welfare 
estimates of energy policies and energy market forecasts. This study found that the 
estimate of social welfare loss caused by electricity price increases would be 
overestimated if an energy market model assumes elasticity less than the actual 
responsiveness. The original NEMS employs a short-run price elasticity of -0.15 for 
heating and cooling equipment, dryers, standard lighting, PCs, and TVs. The price 
elasticities of the remaining residential technologies are set at zero. These modeling 
assumptions may accurately reflect past consumers’ behavioral characteristics in periods 
of energy price volatility, but they might not accurately reflect those in the present or 
future when prices continue to rise in real terms (Brown et al., 2010).  On the other hand, 
in the long run, higher energy prices are associated with significantly greater adoption of 
energy-efficient equipment (Anderson and Newell, 2004; Hassett and Metcalf, 1995; 
Jaffe et al., 1995). The increased adoption of energy-efficient technologies would result 
in a more elastic demand in the long run, as this study showed in Chapter 6. On balance, 
Supposing that 1) the short-run elasticity of -0.66 reflects the actual consumers’ 
responsiveness to price changes in the present and future and 2) retail electricity prices 
 109 
permanently increase by 10%, the welfare loss caused by the price increases would be 
estimated 0.9 billion dollars less than the current estimates with the elasticity of -0.15.  
 In addition to assessing potential savings expected from consumers’ behavioral 
changes with the concept of price elasticity of demand in neoclassical economic theory, 
this study conducted a broader review of theories about behavioral features of energy 
consumers, and discussed how existing information programs could be improved. To 
motivate households to change their energy-use habits in the short run, well-designed 
information and training programs reflecting their needs and feedback are required. The 
effect of information on consumers’ choices depends on how the information is 
transferred. Thus, government agencies should carefully consider behavioral factors in 
the disclosures they control (Allcott Mullainathan, 2010). Developing psychological 
nudges to make consumers move toward an energy-efficient lifestyle also could make 
people more sensitive to price changes and eventually conserve more energy in the short 
run. Some psychological cues typically cost very little as compared with other financial 
incentives. When combined with consumption-monitoring systems such as smart meters, 
these changes could be expedited. 
  To enhance the long-run responses, on the other hand, governments can increase 
the energy efficiency basically through some monetary incentives for installing new 
technologies, such as tax credits and subsidies. In addition, disclosing useful information 
about the performance of new equipment could help consumers to adopt new 
technologies so that they actively respond to price changes. The informational programs 
for energy-efficient technologies could lower the gap between the socially optimal level 
of efficiency and actual observed efficiency. Governments can also utilize positive 
externalities associated with learning by using for accelerating the adoption of new and 
efficient technologies. The experience and knowledge absorbed to consumers motivate 
only themselves to buy additional energy-efficient equipment, but also non-participants 
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to join the energy efficiency program. The more the equipment resale market is activated, 
the more consumers would be willing to change their stock of appliances.  
On balance, this study suggests that rigorous empirical studies on consumers’ 
behavioral attributes are prerequisite for the effective program design. Governments can 
establish potentially high-impact behavioral research programs as part of their broader 
energy innovation programs to analyze consumers’ behavior scientifically and 
continuously. The research programs should include careful testing protocols of their 
impacts. Additionally, behavioral interventions should have clearly measurable outcomes 























Electricity Grouped Grouped -0.07 to -0.61 -0.34 to -1.00 -0.81 to -1.66 




Electricity Aggregate Static -0.08 to -0.45  -0.48 to -1.53 
Electricity Aggregate Dynamic -0.03 to -0.49  -0.44 to -1.89 
Electricity Aggregate Structural -0.16  0.00 to -1.28 
Electricity Aggregate Other -0.18 to -0.54  -0.72 to -2.10 
Electricity Household Dynamic -0.16  -0.45 
Electricity Household Static -0.14  -0.7 
Electricity Household Structural -0.25  -0.66 
Natural Gas Aggregate Static   -1.54 to -2.42 
Natural Gas Aggregate Dynamic -0.15 to -0.50  -0.48 to -1.02 
Natural Gas Aggregate Structural -0.3  -2 
Natural Gas Household Dynamic -0.28  -0.37 









Electricity Aggregate Static  0.00 to -1.57 -0.18 to -0.52 
Electricity Aggregate Dynamic 0.00 to -0.35  -0.26 to -2.50 
Electricity Household Structural -0.20 to -0.76   
Electricity Household Static  -0.55 to -0.71 -0.05 to -0.71 
Electricity Household Structural +0.04 to -0.67  -1.40 to -1.51 
Natural Gas Aggregate Dynamic -0.23 to -0.35  -2.79 to -3.44 
Natural Gas Aggregate Dynamic -0.03 to -0.05  -0.26 to -0.33 
Natural Gas Household Static   -0.22 to -0.60 
Dahl (1993) 
Prior Surveys 







Electricity Aggregate Grouped +0.57 to -0.80 -0.11 to -1.11 +0.77 to -2.20 
Electricity Household Grouped -0.02 to -0.97 -0.05 to -0.97 -0.38 to -1.40 
Natural Gas Aggregate Grouped +0.02 to -0.35 1.86 to -2.41 1.56 to -3.44 
Natural Gas Household Grouped -0.63 to -0.88 -0.08 to -1.80 -1.09 to -1.49 
Fuel Oil Aggregate Grouped -0.10 to -0.59 -0.77 to -1.22  
Fuel Oil Household Grouped -0.18 to -0.19 -1.09 to -1.56 -0.62 to -0.67 
Source: C. Dahl, A Survey of Energy Demand Elasticities in Support of the Development of the 




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE OF ESPEY AND 
ESPEY (2004)* 
Variable Short-run Price Long-run Price Short-run Income Long-run Income 
Elasticity -0.35 -0.85 0.28 0.97 
Demand Specification     
  Reduced form 0.77 0.85 0.74 0.86 
  Structural 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.14 
  Static 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.56 
  Dynamic 0.40 - 0.45 0.44 
  Lag dependent variable - 0.34 - - 
  Other lag - 0.10 - - 
  Stock included 0.61 0.13 0.55 0.12 
  Substitute included 0.54 0.46 0.68 0.44 
  Temperature included - - 0.76 - 
  Household Size - - - 0.17 
  Double log model 0.53 0.92 0.58 0.92 
  Non-double log model 0.47 0.08 0.42 0.08 
Data characteristics     
  Household level 0.49 - - - 
  Time series 0.11 0.56 0.14 0.56 
  Cross sectional 0.30 0.11 0.21 0.14 
  Cross sectional time 
series 
0.59 0.33 0.65 0.30 
  Monthly 0.41 0.08 0.44 0.06 
  Annual 0.59 0.92 0.56 0.94 
  Average (price) 0.36 0.70 0.39 0.71 
  Marginal (price) 0.64 0.27 0.61 0.29 
  Increasing block (price) 0.07 - - - 
  Decreasing block (price) 0.39 0.60 0.42 0.58 
Time and location     
  Aggregate 0.36 0.26 0.50 0.25 
  Regional 0.64 0.74 0.50 0.75 
  United States 0.95 0.92 0.92 0.94 
  Non-United States 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.06 
  Pre-1972 0.34 0.82 0.40 0.81 
  1972-1981 0.85 0.82 0.81 0.79 
  Post-1981 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.15 
Estimation Technique     
  Ordinary least squares 0.37 0.08 0.32 0.09 
  Non-ordinary least 
squares 
0.63 0.92 0.68 0.91 




TECHNOLOGY CHOICE COMPONENT OF RDM IN NEMS 
(Source: EIA, Model Documentation Report: Residential Sector Demand Module of the 
National Energy Modeling System , April 2007) 
 
The Technology Choice Component uses a log-linear function to estimate technology 
market shares. The module is able to calculate market shares based on consumer behavior 
as a function of bias, capital costs, and operating costs or as a function of life-cycle costs. 
New equipment operating costs are computed by the expression, 
 
                                                                               
 
where, 
OPCOSTy,es,b,r,v is the operating cost for the specific equipment type by year, housing 
type, and Census Division, and vintage;  
PRICESf,r,y is the fuel price for the equipment by fuel, by region and forecast year; 
EQCUECr,eg,b is the unit energy consumption by Census Division, equipment class and 
housing type;  
HDDFACTr,y is a factor, the ratio between heating degree days in the current year and in 
the base year, for adjusting for abnormal weather in either the base year or in the current 
year;  
RTEFFACeg,v is the efficiency adjustment for the general equipment class and vintage; 
and HSHELLy-1,r,v is the shell efficiency adjustment to account for building shell 
improvements over time (which reduce heating loads).  
 
For newly constructed homes, operating cost is a function of both the heating and cooling 
operating costs, with the shell efficiency also accounted for as shown: 
 
 114 
                   
                                                         
                                                      
                               




HTSHELLeg,r,b is the heating shell efficiency factor for the HVAC system; CDDFACTr,y 
is the cooling degree-day adjustment; and CLSHELLeg,r,b is the cooling shell efficiency 
factor for the HVAC system. 
 
The consumer is allowed to choose among the various levels of cost and efficiency for a 
given class of equipment. Electric heat pumps are an example of an equipment class 
(denoted by eg). Equipment type (denoted by es) refers to the same class of equipment 
with different efficiency ratings (e.g., high vs low efficiency electric heat pumps). 
 
EQCOST is a time-dependant function for computing the installed capital cost of 
equipment in new construction and the retail replacement cost of equipment in existing 
housing. It is called if the cost trend switch COSTTRSW = 1 in COMMON RTEK 
(which is the default). Its mathematical description is as follows: 
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EQCOSTes,y,ctype is time-dependant installed capital cost of equipment in new construction 
or the retail replacement cost of equipment in existing housing;  
ctype tells function type of equipment cost to return;  
CAP = Return installed capital cost in new construction;  
RET = Return retail replacement cost in existing housing;  
RTMATUREes Technology maturity description;  
MATURE = No further equipment cost reductions expected;  
ADOLESCENT = Major cost reductions occurred before base year;  
INFANT = All cost reductions expected after first year available;  
RTEQCOSTes Installed wholesale capital cost in $2004 per unit for new homes, remains 
constant for MATURE technologies only (used when ctype = CAP);  
RTRECOSTes Retail capital cost in $2004 per unit for replacements, remains constant for 
MATURE technologies only (used when ctype = RET);  
y0 is the year of inflection of cost trend; RTINITYRes if ADOLESCENT; RTCOSTP1es 
if INFANT;  
y1 is the year cost decline began; RTCOSTP1es if ADOLESCENT; RTINITYRes if 
INFANT;  
d is the total possible proportional decline in equipment cost, RTCOSTP3es, from y0 
onward if ADOLESCENT, from y1 onward if INFANT;  
r is the logistic curve shape parameter, RTCOSTP2es. 
 
For newly constructed homes, the costs shown above also include the cooling system and 
shell efficiency measures. 
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PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ESTIMATED FROM RECS1997 
lnelecuse Coefficient Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lnelecprice -0.955 0.052 -18.310 0.000 
lnngprice 0.279 0.056 4.950 0.000 
lnhhincome 0.102 0.009 11.750 0.000 
lnrooms 0.683 0.017 40.360 0.000 
lnhdd65 0.070 0.012 5.890 0.000 
lncdd65 -0.001 0.013 -0.050 0.958 
ngcen -0.576 0.023 -25.110 0.000 
ngind -0.737 0.026 -28.860 0.000 
ngboth -0.541 0.124 -4.370 0.000 
ng9 -0.936 0.026 -36.220 0.000 
elecind 0.008 0.034 0.250 0.806 
elecboth -0.355 0.117 -3.030 0.002 
elec9 -0.099 0.035 -2.830 0.005 
othercen -0.392 0.038 -10.450 0.000 
otherind -0.595 0.030 -19.530 0.000 
Otherboth -0.501 0.180 -2.790 0.005 
other9 -0.726 0.031 -23.510 0.000 
_cons 11.203 0.239 46.870 0.000 
 
R-squared = 0.5024 
Adj R-squared = 0.5009 
Number of obs =    5801 
 




SOURCE CODES FOR DISTRIBUTED SHORT-RUN ELASTICITY 
CALCULATION FUNCTION  
 
!=================================================================== 
!     DISTRIBUTED SR ELASTICITY CALCULATION FUNCTION 
!=================================================================== 
      REAL FUNCTION RSELAST (F,R,ALPHA,EF1,EF2,EF3,RECSYEAR) 
      IMPLICIT NONE 
      REAL*4 EF1,EF2,EF3 
      REAL*4 ALPHA 
      INTEGER F,R,RECSYEAR 
      REAL*4 FAC1,FAC2,FAC3 
 
  !    NOTE EF1+EF2+EF3 SHOULD SUM TO 1.0 -- THEY ARE DISTRIBUTIONAL 
SHARES FOR THE SHORT RUN ELASTICITY EFFECTS 
 
 FAC1=1.  ;  FAC2=1.  ;  FAC3=1.   !INITIALIZE  
 
      IF 
(CURCALYR>=RECSYEAR+1)FAC1=(PRICES(F,R,CURCALYR  )/PRICES(F,R,RECSYEA
R))**(ALPHA*EF1) 
      IF (CURCALYR>=RECSYEAR+2)FAC2=(PRICES(F,R,CURCALYR-
1)/PRICES(F,R,RECSYEAR))**(ALPHA*EF2) 
      IF (CURCALYR>=RECSYEAR+3)FAC3=(PRICES(F,R,CURCALYR-
2)/PRICES(F,R,RECSYEAR))**(ALPHA*EF3) 
 
      RSELAST=FAC1*FAC2*FAC3 
 !      write(DGDAT,*) 
"rselast=",rselast,CURCALYR,PRICES(F,R,CURCALYR),RECSYEAR,prices(f,r,recsyear)!pro
duces copious output in rdgenout 
      RETURN  
      END FUNCTION RSELAST 
 
    END SUBROUTINE RESD   ! CLOSES THE CONTAINS STRUCTURE  
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APPENDIX G 
MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF DUBIN AND MCFADDEN (1984)  
Several econometric models consistent with utility maximization which could be 
used to describe appliance choice and electricity consumption are outlined first. In the 
present analysis, block rate structure is ignored, and electricity treated as a commodity 
available in any quantity at a fixed marginal (=average) price. Also, appliance holding 
decisions is analyzed as if they are contemporaneous with usage decisions, and do not 
involve intertemporal considerations. The approach combines the method of development 
of discrete choice models from conditional indirect utility functions employed in 
McFadden (1981) and the method developed by Hausman (1979) for recovery of indirect 
utility functions from econometric partial demand systems. 
The consumer face a choice of m mutually exclusive, exhaustive appliance 
portfolios, which can be indexed i = 1, …, m. Portfolio i has a rental price (annualized 
cost) ri. Given portfolio i, the consumer has a conditional indirect utility function.  
 
                           (1)  
 
where P1 is price of electricity, P2 is price of alternative energy sources, y is income, Si is 
observed attributes of portfolio i,   i is unobserved attributes of portfolio i, ri is price of 
portfolio i,   is unobserved characteristics of the consumer, and all prices and income are 
deflated by an  index of nonenergy commodity prices. Electricity and alternative 
consumption levels, given portfolio i, are (by Roy’s identity) 
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 (3) 
The probability that portfolio i is chosen is 
 
                                                                           
   (4) 
 
Any function V with the necessary and sufficient properties of an indirect utility function 
can be used to construct econometric forms for joint discrete/continuous choice. 
 A second method of obtaining a discrete/continuous demand system is to start 
from a parametric specification of the unit electricity consumption (UEC) equation, treat 
Roy’s identity as a partial differential equation whose solution defines a conditional 
indirect utility function, and then define the discrete choice probabilities from the indirect 
utility function. This procedure can be carried through for functions in which UEC levels 
exhibit some income elasticity. First consider systems in which the UEC equation is 
linear in income, 
 
              
             (5) 
with m
i
 linear in parameters and the distribution of     depending in general on discrete 
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   (7) 
And   is a function which is increasing in its first argument. The demand for substitute 
energy satisfies 
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in (6). Consider a special case of (6) in which         is the same for all i. The discrete 
choice probabilities satisfy 
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A special case of this system which yields simple functional form is 
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with       common across alternatives, and 
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Alternatively, consider the special case of (6) in which       and 
                  
 
  
            (13) 
Analogously to (10) define 
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The UEC equation is then 
     
    
      
                 (15) 
And the choice probability satisfy 
                               (16) 
With 
      





   
      
         
     (17) 
Econometric studies of UEC have in most cases assumed, implicitly or explicitly, 
statistical independence of appliance portfolio choice and the additive error in the UEC 
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